



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# Briefly Noted ✓

24 May 1965

Bankrupt      Fidel Castro Selling  
Economy      Heirlooms

Cuban refugee groups are continuing their efforts to prevent Fidel Castro from selling art objects which he confiscated when they fled their homes to escape living under his Communist dictatorship.

Reports from Milan (NYTimes and Press Comment May 12) say that a shipment of the paintings, silver, bronzes, porcelain and other heirlooms has arrived, is blocked in a warehouse there, but has been paid for by a Milan art dealer. This represents about a quarter of the estimated total two million dollars of the "Treasure of Fidel Castro" sent to European countries for sale.

The Cuban Government has been hard pressed to meet deficits accumulated over the years from a deteriorating economy and from excessive borrowing and spending for military establishments and aggressive-subversion throughout Latin America.

Selling family heirlooms is the last resort of the impoverished before bankruptcy is admitted. Sympathy is also due the Cuban people and future generations for the loss of this part of their cultural heritage which is being thrown away so wantonly.

\* \* \*

Communists      Sino-Soviet Conflict  
Expose Their      Continues in Youth Front  
Fronts in  
Africa

Chicom attacks on the Soviets at youth meetings increasingly reveal the extent to which the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) is subordinate to Moscow. The latest series of incidents occurred at the WFDY Executive Committee meeting in Accra (15-21 April) before an audience of over 100 delegates from 56 countries. Ironically, the Chicoms say what non-Communists have always maintained, that WFDY is an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Going one step further, the Chicoms even described WFDY's current designed-in-Moscow-objectives as opposing China rather than imperialism.

Using WFDY as a whipping boy, the Chicoms took the Soviets to task on several counts, especially Vietnam. A previously approved IUS (International Union of Students)/WFDY statement was condemned as a "peaceful political solution" that appeases the U.S. when what the Vietnamese want is American troop withdrawal. The conference resolution on Vietnam was branded a "trick" and its passage rejected on grounds of Soviet voting manipulation. Although TASS failed to report a Sino-Soviet clash, the Soviets retaliated by implying that the Chicoms have been interfering with shipments of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam -- which the Chicoms flatly denied.

\* \* \*

The Chicoms were equally vociferous on other issues, notably an amendment condemning peaceful co-existence and the United Nations, but to no immediate avail. Although the Chicoms drew their usual support from delegations representing North Korea, Indonesia, Japan, North Vietnam and the NLFSV, they gained African backing only from Congo (Brazzaville) and the Federation des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire en France. A WFDY press release asserts that the majority of the resolutions (not yet published) were adopted unanimously; it does not spell out the apparent isolation of the Chicoms on key issues.

The resolutions of the African youth leadership seminar (20-23 April, sponsored by the Ghana Young Pioneers) echoed the stance taken by the WFDY executive committee session. This sequel of events, billed to focus on Africa (i.e., the forthcoming World Youth Festival, the first in Africa, to be held in Algiers in July; future WFDY activities among African youth struggling against colonialism), offered both the Soviets and the Chicoms an opportunity to advance their aspirations in Africa. To the Soviet chagrin, the Chicoms were very active in corridor politicking among African delegations, attacking Soviet direction of the WFDY for hindering the anti-colonial struggle of African youth, and suggesting Afro-Asian solidarity to resist the WFDY. On the conference floor they reinforced their case by denigrating Soviet suppression of the 4 March anti-U.S. demonstration by foreign students in Moscow.

Preparations for impending major events in other front organizations indicate that the Sino-Soviet conflict, as it appeared at this

WFDY gathering, will be epidemic by mid-summer.

\* \* \*

Life in a Memoirs of a Soviet  
Concentration General  
Camp

In March, April, and May of 1964, the Soviet literary journal Novy Mir published the memoirs of General Aleksandr Vasilyevich Gorbatov, a veteran not only of two World Wars and the Civil War, but also of Stalin's prison camps of Kolyma and Magadan. Gorbatov was one of those enlisted veterans of the Czar's army whose military experience and native ability enabled them to rise rapidly in the new Red Army, which was then fighting the Whites and the Poles. His career continued to go well until 1938, when he was arrested during Stalin's purge of the military leadership. He tells us that he refused to confess to crimes he had not committed, and that he also refused to implicate others. Unlike most of his unfortunate comrades, he was released and reinstated in his old rank in March 1941, thanks in large part to the intervention of Marshal Budyenny on his behalf. He made a good record for himself in World War II, rising to the post of Army Commander. His story is very well told, with a stark description of NKVD interrogations and of conditions in the camps. Gorbatov also tells many stories of military skirmishes and command conflicts, as well as of his boyhood experiences. There are two English editions, entitled Black Years (London: Flegon Press, 1964) and Years Off My Life (London: Constable, 1964); there is also an American edition


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issued by Norton, identical to the Constable edition. The original Soviet title was (in translation) Years and Wars.

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Hospitals	<u>If You Disagree,</u>
Replace	<u>You're Insane</u>
Stalin's Camps	
	The ideal totalitar-
	ian regime would not
	use firing squads and rubber hoses;

it would use other methods which, leaving their victims physically unscarred, rob them of any feeling of self-respect, any will to resist. This ideal, described fictionally in Orwell's 1984 and Koestler's Darkness at Noon, and approached in Chinese Communist brainwashing, inspires the post-Stalin treatment of those Soviet citizens who criticize the regime. Instead of sending them to prison camps as "politicals," the KGB now puts them in a mental hospital. After all, from the one-dimensional standpoint of the blindly doctrinaire Communist, a Soviet citizen who doesn't like Communism must be insane.

On 2 May 1965, the London Observer published the first of three installments of excerpts from a new autobiographical novel by Valeriy Tarsis: Ward 7. This sensational story describes the experiences of a political prisoner, nominally a patient, confined in a Soviet mental hospital. As noted in [REDACTED] in this issue, Tarsis and several others are known to have been confined in mental hospitals for political reasons. In 1960, Tarsis had smuggled out another manuscript, The Bluebottle, sharply attacking the Soviet regime, and this led to his confinement for two years in the hospital he describes. The Bluebottle was carried out by an Italian newspaper correspondent, possibly the inspiration for Signor Mario Gozzi in The Fall of the Jesuit (see attachment to [REDACTED])

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The Ward 7 manuscript has likewise been smuggled out. It is being published in Russian in Grany, an exile publication in West Germany, and Collins and Harvill of London published the full translation in book form on 10 May. The three Observer installments appeared in Press Comment on 13, 17 and 20 May.

\* \* \*

Countering the  
SOVIET CAMPAIGN on WORLD WAR II

Twentieth anniversaries of events ending World War II are being used by the USSR in a campaign to increase its stature. The Soviets are claiming credit, inter alia, for defeating the fascists while attempting to grossly discredit the motives and actions of the western allies and particularly the United States.

Rewriting history, an ingrained habit of the Communists to make facts fit their constantly changing posture, is one of the techniques being used in their campaign.

A pamphlet, Moscow Interprets World War Two: How the Soviets Falsify History, illustrates how the Soviets rewrite history for propaganda purposes. It analyzes the methods used in Grigorii Deborin's THE SECOND WORLD WAR, and also shows the ordinary reader how to recognize distortions and questionable statements in such "history books."

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## Significant Dates

### JUNE

- 2 International Labor Conference (ILO), 49th session, Geneva, 2-24 June.
- 14 Treaty of Tientsin, second "Unequal Treaty," similar to 16 May Treaty of Aigan. 1858
- 15 Magna Carta signed at Runnymede by King John. 1215. (750th anniversary.)
- 17 International Christian Democratic Youth Congress, West Berlin, June, to end on 17 June, anniversary of East German revolt. 1953
- 17 USSR occupies Estonia and Latvia despite non-aggression treaties. World War II, 1940. Twenty-fifth anniversary.
- 17 Hungary announces trial and execution of Imre Nagy. 1958
- 18 Conference of Solidarity with Cuba, Montevideo, Uruguay 18-20 June.
- 19 Chinese Communists charged with Tibetan genocide by International Commission of Jurists. 1960. Fifth anniversary.
- 19 Sixteen Polish leaders of Home Army and legitimate Govt-in-exile, earlier invited to Soviet Occupation Headquarters under safe conduct, tried in Moscow for "anti-Soviet activity" 19-21 June 1945. (Sentenced 22 July). 1945 Twentieth anniversary WW II.
- 22 Germany invades the USSR. 1941.
- 24 Afro-Asian Foreign Ministers Meeting, prelim to II Afro-Asian Conference, heads of state, opening 29 June, Algiers.
- 25 North Korean Army crosses 38th Parallel. 27 June, UN Security Council (USSR boycotting) resolves aid to Republic of Korea; 7 July establishes UN Command, 53 nations endorse assistance, 17 contribute units to UN Force. 1950. Fifteenth anniversary.
- 26 Conference of 46 nations, convened in San Francisco 25 April, adopts UN Charter. 1945. Twentieth anniversary.
- 28 Rumania bows to USSR's ultimatum, cedes Bessarabia, Bucovina and Hertza District. 1940. Twenty-fifth anniversary.
- 28 Cominform condemns Tito and associates, expells Yugoslav Party from "family of fraternal Communist Parties."
- 29 Czechoslovakia cedes Ruthenia to USSR. 1945. Twentieth anniversary.

# PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



#53

Commentary

28 April-11 May 1965

## Principal Developments:

1. Communist parties, states, and media during this period are heavily concerned with the continuing warfare in Vietnam, the new crisis in the Dominican Republic, the annual May Day celebrations, and the 20th anniversaries of the "great victory of the forces of socialism over fascism" and the "liberation" of East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Soviets, basking in the glory of their almost-single-handed (according to Communist accounts) triumph, calmly reiterate their adherence to the "general line" formulated by the "20th, 21st, and 22nd Congresses and the Party Program."
2. The Chinese, however, use the anniversaries to strike hard at the "Khrushchev revisionists" in three major articles, in Red Flag Nos. 4 & 5 and in People's Daily on 9 May. They also revive the campaign against "brutal Soviet suppression of anti-U.S. student demonstrators," publicizing: (a) an inflammatory Chinese Foreign Ministry note of 13 April to the SovGovt referring back to the 4 March Moscow affair, -- which the Soviets returned without reply; (b) a "recent" letter to Pravda by 12 Vietnamese students in Moscow denouncing an "eyewitness report" of the 4 March demonstration by Soviet citizens which Pravda had published 13 March, -- with a demand that Pravda "publish a correction of these falsehoods immediately"; and (c) a lurid account of an entirely new case of "savage" Soviet repression of an attempted anti-U.S. demonstration on 3 April in Leningrad by a large number of Vietnamese students. The Chinese also (d) ostentatiously publicize reports of several anti-revisionist materials appearing several weeks ago in organs of the pro-Chinese dissident "CP of Australia (M-L)" and the Chinese-aligned CP of New Zealand; (e) describe another fierce struggle with Soviet manipulators at an April WFDY Executive meeting in Accra (see also Briefly Noted); and (f) accuse the Soviets of an "act of sabotage and split" in an exhibit beginning 3 days before the opening of the AAPSO meeting scheduled for 10 May in Accra (Winneba).
3. Analysts believe that the wording of the 1965 Sino-Soviet trade protocol, signed in Moscow 29 April, indicates a further decline in total trade levels, in contrast to increases in Chinese trade agreements with all East European countries except Bulgaria.
4. North Vietnamese statements continue to show far more moderation than the Chinese and an apparent desire to maintain good relations with the Soviets.
5. The Pajetta-led Italian CP delegation is reportedly receiving a warm welcome in Hanoi, where Nan Dhan publishes "warm and sincere thanks"



for Italian "valuable support." In contrast, NCNA's report of the delegation's 1-day stop-over in Peking indicates no warmth or agreement.

6. Beyond the 1 May NYTimes account included in our Chronology, there have been several clandestine reports to the effect that Castro's regime is shifting significantly away from a Chinese orientation toward the Soviets.

7. Diplomatic observers speculate on some evidence that the Czech regime may be about to move toward Rumanian-style independence. Top-level Rumanian representation in Prague for the "liberation" anniversary -- in contrast to the CPSU and other parties which sent their senior delegations to East Berlin -- seems to harmonize with Novotny's declaration of intent to improve relations specifically with the Chinese and Albanians.

8. The brief published reports of a meeting of representatives of West European CPs in Brussels to discuss preparations for a summit meeting of all in accordance with French CP initiative (see Chrono, April 18-24) are confirmed by clandestine reporting, which says that 13 parties were represented in Brussels and the summit will probably be held early June. A subsequent report cites "Stockholm sources" to the effect that representatives of the 4 Scandinavian CPs meeting there around the 1st of May were unable to agree on a joint attitude toward the French-sponsored meeting.

Significance:

While the Soviets, riding the crest of Communist 20th anniversary celebrations of their great triumph over fascism, confine themselves to calm, confident reiteration of their Khrushchevian line, the Chinese intensify their anti-Soviet polemics in a series of strident, new attacks hammering away at the "Khrushchev revisionists," Soviet falsification of history, sham anti-imperialism, sham support of national liberation, and real "Soviet-U.S. cooperation for domination of the world." In renewing their old campaign against "brutal Soviet suppression of anti-U.S. student demonstrators," they concentrate on the Vietnamese aspect, even reporting an alleged new incident in Leningrad involving only Vietnamese victims.

However, the North Vietnamese leadership, presumably a chief target of the Chinese polemics, continues to demonstrate a determined resistance to being too closely identified with the Chinese. Particularly significant is their reportedly warm welcome to the Pajetta-led delegation from the Italian CP, in the face of past Chinese scathing denunciation of the PCI and apparently cool treatment given the Italians in Peking en route in contrast to the obvious Soviet favor demonstrated during their Moscow stop-over.


Bitter public Sino-Soviet battling may be anticipated at a number of forthcoming international meetings. As reported herein, the Chinese have already accused the Soviets of "an act of sabotage and split" before the opening of the Accra AAPSO meeting due to get under way as this period closes. Other major events will be the 2nd ("Bandung") Conference of

Afro-Asian states in Algiers 29 June (where the controversial question of Soviet participation is still to be decided), the World Peace Council congress in Helsinki 10-17 July, and the 9th World Youth Festival in Algiers 28 July-7 August.

Two other developments bear watching: the possible Czech move toward closer identification with the Rumanians and their independent stance; the outcome of the French CP-sponsored regional conference of West European CP scheduled for Brussels early in June.

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#53

28 April-11 May 1965

Continuing from April 23: The Italian CP delegation headed by Pajetta (see #51 & #52 for earlier reports) arrives in Hanoi on the 30th, after a 1-day stop in Peking is reported by NCNA on the 29th. The NCNA report indicates that the Italians did not meet any top-level CCP figures and says only that "both sides elaborated their own views on the Vietnam question." However, PCI daily L'Unita on 1 May claims that the delegation flew from Canton to Hanoi "in a Chinese plane made especially available" to them. The Italians are met at the Hanoi airport by "a large North Vietnamese Party delegation headed by Secretary Le Duan," and are received by Ho Chi Minh later the same day. They are feature guests at Hanoi's May Day celebration and are reported as having "exchanged views on questions which interest both parties" in "a cordial and friendly atmosphere" with a Le Duan-led host delegation on the 3rd. They are still reported as visiting museums and exhibitions on the 7th. Meanwhile, an editorial in daily Nhan Dan on the 3rd "extends the warm and sincere thanks of the Vietnamese people for the valuable support given them by the working class and other people of Italy in their national salvation struggle against U.S. aggression."

April 18-24: Finnish CP daily Kansan Uutiset on 18th announces that Secretary Poikolainen will represent the Party at a meeting of West European CPs in Brussels 20 April to discuss preparations for a summit meeting of WE CPs. French CP daily L'Humanite on the 24th reports that such a meeting had been held: no date or place mentioned, but the report seems to confirm Brussels by quoting from a communique of the Belgian CP on the meeting.

April 29: Signing in Moscow of the 1965 Sino-Soviet trade protocol is announced: no figures are given, but observers think that the wording suggests a further decline in total trade levels, -- in contrast to the announcements of China's 1965 trade agreements with the East European countries which (except for Bulgaria) explicitly mentioned plans for higher trade.

April 29-30: Two successive Pravda editorials pegged to May Day reiterate CPSU "unshakable" support of "the scientific nature of the Party's policy and its general political line ... expressed in the decisions of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Party Congresses and the CPSU Program."

May 1: May Day celebrations by the ruling CPs bring no surprises: they are generally somewhat subdued in favor of the impending 20th anniversary of VE Day.

A NYTimes dispatch from Havana by Paul Hofmann reports that "the works of Mao Tse-tung have disappeared from the bookstore of the Cuban State Publishing Department, but writings by Nikita S. Khrushchev are

still on display. Referring to Castro's 13 March speech warning that his government would not tolerate the introduction of "the apple of discord" into the Eden of Cuban Communism, Hofmann writes "there are indications that the withdrawal of Mr. Mao's works may be a consequence of Cuban ideological vigilance."

May 2: NCNA reports on the 15-21 April Accra WFDY Executive Meeting, which "was the scene of a fierce struggle between real and sham anti-imperialism, between real and sham unity." The account bristles with Chinese charges of Soviet manipulation, tricks, calumny, and "extremely undemocratic means to force their capitulationist and splittist line upon others under the pretext of 'stopping polemics.'" It states that the Soviet delegation was completely isolated in the voting for at least two items in the resolution: one a condemnation of U.S. crimes in the Congo, and the other a Rumanian demand that the draft resolution "firmly support the right of the peoples of all countries to run their own affairs without interference by foreign countries."

May 3: NCNA publicizes the text of an editorial on "The Great Victory of Leninism" in Red Flag No. 4, published in April. It recalls Chinese publication in 1960, in commemoration of Lenin's 90th anniversary, of the three "Long Live Leninism" articles, in which, "although at that time we did not yet openly criticize Khrushchev and the leadership of the CPSU, the views expressed ... were the diametric opposite of the pack of nonsense dispensed by the K. revisionists." This "aroused the livid hatred of the K. revisionists and scared the living daylights out of them." After reiterating their old line and their old charges on "the nature of imperialism," "peaceful coexistence," and "the national liberation movement," the Chinese say:

"Thus, the facts of the past five years have mercilessly shattered the absurd arguments of the modern revisionists. After the fall of Khrushchev, which was a public proclamation of the bankruptcy of modern revisionism, we hoped that the new CPSU leadership would honestly and openly admit its mistakes and renounce the revisionist line and policies pursued when K was in power, and we advised them to do so. However, contrary to the aspirations of the Soviet people and the revolutionary peoples of the world, the new CPSU leadership has taken over K revisionism as a priceless heritage and has continued to brandish it. During the celebrations this year of the 95th anniversary of Lenin's birth, they still had the effrontery to brag that 'the general line drafted in the 20th and 22nd Congresses of our Party and embodied in the Program of the CPSU' is a 'vivid indication' of a 'creative approach' to theory. It was precisely in the name of a so-called 'creative approach' to Leninism that K actually renounced every fundamental thesis of Leninism, became the greatest revisionist in all history, and finally ended up in total bankruptcy. Can his successors come to any better end?

May 5: NCNA Peking publicizes a CP of New Zealand statement, "released 24 March," denouncing the 1 March 19-party meeting in Moscow as another CPSU move "to compel the world parties to embrace a revisionist line"

which "met with another setback." (This would seem to be the same as the CPNZ statement on subject publicized by NCNA on 31 March, but the passages quoted are entirely different.)

May 5-7: The Chinese publicize a series of new developments and charges relating to Soviet suppression of anti-U.S., pro-Vietnam demonstrations. On the 5th, NCNA reports on a Chinese Foreign Ministry note to the Soviet Embassy dated 13 April protesting Soviet expulsion from the institutions where they were enrolled of the four Chinese students who went back to Peking "for medical treatment" after they had been "severely injured by Soviet troops and police" in the 4 March demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The tone of the Chinese note is reflected in the following passage:

"It is precisely clear that the real reason for the expulsion by the Soviet authorities ... is that the outrages committed by you in cracking down on the anti-American demonstration and persecuting the injured students were too ugly, that you are afraid that these students would expose the true facts of the entire incident upon their return to these institutions from their own country. So you try to cover up your crime by expelling them from the institutions. In addition, you try, by this act of repression, to intimidate other students and prevent them from taking part in anti-American activities in the future. But all this is in vain.... The perverted actions of the Soviet Government will only expose once again its own true features of sham solidarity and sham anti-imperialism."

Not surprisingly, "the Soviet Embassy actually returned the memorandum" to the Chinese FM on 20 April!

On the 6th, NCNA reports on a "recent" letter to Pravda, "which to this day Pravda has not dared to publish," by 12 Vietnamese students at the Institute of Geological Prospecting in Moscow "sternly refuting the distortion made by that paper concerning the Soviet authorities' repression of the anti-U.S. demonstration staged by Asian, African, and Latin American students in Moscow on 4 March, and its shameless, slanderous attacks on these students." The Vietnamese letter tells how "the Soviet Red Army surrounded ... (and) beat us" and claims that "75 Vietnamese students were wounded, 4 girls seriously." It concludes: "We demand that you publish a correction of these falsehoods immediately," -- and shows copies sent to NCNA and VNA in addition to the original to Pravda.

Also on the 6th, NCNA publicizes an entirely new charge that on 3 April Soviet authorities "savagely suppressed Vietnamese students in Leningrad for their demand to hold an anti-U.S. rally."

"In this incident, 82 Vietnamese students were arrested and 7 wounded, among them 3 seriously (including one girl). This was another shameful atrocity committed by Soviet authorities...."

After describing Soviet "tricks" to try to prevent the Vietnamese from holding a 3 April anti-U.S. demonstration, for which the authorities on 1 April had granted permission, NCNA describes how the Soviet authorities "suddenly rushed some 300 police to the scene and brutally cracked down on the Vietnamese students."

"The Soviet police seized and tore up the placards inscribed with anti-U.S. slogans and the banners in the hands of the Vietnamese students. They even went to such lengths as to trample under foot the national flags of the DRV."

NCNA concludes with a paragraph sardonically asking the Soviet authorities how they can reconcile their "sweet-sounding words" about "practical support" to the DRV with their "repeated suppression of foreign students who call for the holding of meetings and demonstrations against the U.S. aggressors."

"A person's words have to be judged by his deeds. Obviously, the outrage perpetrated by the Soviet authorities in Leningrad exposed once against their sham anti-imperialism and sham support."

NCNA reports on the 7th that People's Daily and other Peking papers devote a full page to the Vietnamese letter to Pravda and the above account of Soviet suppression of the Vietnamese students in Leningrad, together with pictures, including "a Soviet armyman seizing the national flag of the DRV from the hands of a Vietnamese student and unscrupulously trampling it under foot," and another one "mercilessly manhandling a frail Vietnamese girl."

May 6 & 8: NCNA reports on two anti-Soviet items appearing in recent issues of Vanguard, organ of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia (M-L). On the 6th, NCNA tells of a Vanguard report (date not given) on the Chinese 23 March People's Daily/Red Flag attack on the 1 March Moscow "consultative meeting," calling the Chinese comment "a splendid and inspiring call to all people of the world to be on guard against the tricks of the modern revisionists." On the 8th, NCNA quotes from a denunciation of the 1 March meeting by CPA (M-L) Chairman Hill as printed in the 23 April Vanguard.

May 7-10: The CPs of the world celebrate the 20th anniversary of VE Day as a great triumph of the forces of socialism over fascism, with attacks on "U.S. imperialism" as fascism's successor varying in directness and vituperation in accordance with each Party's stand in the Sino-Soviet conflict. In Europe, the victory anniversary is also merged with "liberation" anniversaries in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The East German celebration is favored by top-level delegations from the CPSU (headed by Kosygin, vs. Podgorny to Czechoslovakia), Poland (Cyrankiewicz), Italy (Longo) and a few others. The Rumanians, however, favor Prague with their top-level delegation (headed by Maurer), the only party or state to do so. In Prague, Novotny, while pledging fidelity to Moscow, says that the Czechs

intend to work for closer relations with the Chinese and Albanians in the interest of a "united front" against the "imperialists" whose "aggression is encouraged by Communist disunity."

Soviet speeches and statements, while hard in their condemnation of "U.S. aggression," hold firm to the Khrushchevian "peaceful coexistence" line. Limited positive mention of Stalin's contribution is made and Marshals Voroshilov and Zhukov were accorded full recognition. The Chinese, however, use the occasion to publish two major, 10,000-word blasts, one in People's Daily on the 9th and one in Red Flag No. 5, appearing on the 10th. Both savagely attack the U.S. as trying to follow in Hitler's footsteps, but the former is aimed even more against the CPSU leadership than against the U.S.

The People's Daily article, entitled "The Historical Experience of the War Against Fascism," is a highly assertive CCP polemic on the "whole series of important differences of principle between Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists on the question of how to assess the anti-Fascist war and on the lessons to be drawn from it," necessary because "the K. revisionists ... have been deliberately distorting history ever since the 20th CPSU Congress, obscuring facts and concocting conclusions that are extremely harmful." The victory of fascism was achieved primarily by the Soviet people and army, but it is "indissolubly linked with Stalin's leadership" and was made possible only by the socialist system and the dictatorship of the proletariat. The drawn-out Chinese correction of the modern Soviet "falsifiers of history" builds up to a parallel between the British-French-U.S. appeasement of fascism and the present Soviet "betrayal of proletarian internationalism."

"Instead of uniting with all possible forces against U.S. imperialism, they are bent on aligning themselves with U.S. imperialism against the people of the world and on realizing U.S.-Soviet world hegemony....

How can you expect 'concerted action' with the M-Ls and masses of the people in all countries, who constitute over 90% of the world's population, when you persist in the revisionist line laid down at the 20th and 22nd Congresses and embodied in the program of the PCSU, and when you persist in the line of 'Soviet-U.S. cooperation for domination of the world?'..."

Indicatively, of the 16 footnoted references listed at the end of the article, 12 are from the works of Mao, 3 from Stalin, and 1 from Lenin!

The Red Flag article, entitled "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism" and signed by Lo Jui-ching, a senior general who is Vice Minister of Defense, is an extremely bellicose exposition of the militant Chinese views on war, "paper tigers," nuclear weapons, etc. "This decade is witnessing atomic imperialism playing a superb farce." "U.S. imperialism is like a large tree eaten hollow by worms." Etc.



In reviewing the lessons of the "great victory," Lo loses no opportunity to strike at Soviet distortion of history and taunts:

"Just imagine, if the Soviet people and army had not been led by Stalin but by revisionists such as Khrushchev,... the outcome could only have been disastrous defeat or capitulation...."

His review concludes that:

"... although a war imposed on us by imperialism will cause sacrifices, losses, and destruction, it will also educate the people, and the people will win the war as well as peace and progress."


May 8: NCNA reports from Accra on a "so-called photo and books exhibition arranged by the Soviet delegation to the 4th Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference" which opened the previous day in the hall where the conference will begin on 10 May. "The exhibition has on display anti-China pamphlets and thus challenges the conference even before its opening by this act of sabotage and split." NCNA says that the Ghanaians expressed opposition and some removed the exhibit 10 minutes after the Soviets had completed it. Next morning, however, the Soviets completely renewed it.

24 May 1965

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STUDY IN AMBIVALENCE  
Communist Front Organizations in India

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SITUATION:

"India without Nehru needs strong and decisive government, and all those who would lose if India crumbles have a right to look for more of it than they see now. What anyone outside thinks is vastly less important than what is thought in India. It is those who feel about India with the perception and the blindness of being Indian who will decide what happens to Mr. Shastri, and to his party."  
(Economist - April 3, 1965)

India offers a uniquely favorable environment for Communist-front organizations. Its cultural, linguistic, racial and religious heterogeneity presents an ideal breeding-ground in which various dissident groups prosper and agitate for a wide variety of general as well as special political interests. A high degree of public interest - especially within the middle class - in political and social matters, combined with a considerable amount of emotionalism, a lack of sufficient knowledge about general and political matters, and frequently an anti-Western and vacillating bias have made it possible for the Communists to organize some 50 active fronts in India, 10 of which are affiliated to international communist front organizations. They reflect not only the Sino-Soviet dissensions current in the World Communist Movement, but have suffered from the consequences of the 1964 split of the Communist Party of India into two parties. The principal groups which are most attracted to Communist fronts have been students, educated working women, artists and writers, and various other members of the educated middle class. The educated unemployed and the minority linguistic groups (as well as refugees from Pakistan) have also been particularly active in front organizations.

The communist movement in India is not considered as a foreign-dominated group by the great mass of the Indian electorate. The CPI, prior to the split, has shared approximately the same slogans with parties of the democratic left, overtly functioned as a conventional political party, and tried to portray itself as a nationalistic party. The fronts in India are apparently even more accepted by the general public which is not alert to the dangers of the world communist movement or the operations of front groups. They are now in the process of being captured by either the Communist Party of India/Left (CPI/L) or the Communist Party of India/Right (CPI/R), and have been relatively inactive the past year or so.

~~SECRET~~

(903 Cont.)

Although the present constitutional system of India is not subject to widespread criticism (individuals in India are usually more a target of attack than the system), there is a strong undercurrent of dissatisfaction among the public with the general condition of the Indian economy and government. Communist front organization efforts to influence government policy have been primarily various forms of agitation outside the Parliament designed to discredit the government. Petitions and demonstrations have been organized on issues such as Kashmir, nuclear testing, the cost of living - and more recently, the Indo-Pakistan confrontation over the Rann of Kutch. Indian fear of China, never far below the surface especially since the Chinese aggression in 1962, has been intensified by what India regards as the development of all too friendly relations between Pakistan and Communist China - the two implacable enemies of India. The explosion of the second nuclear device by Communist China on May 14 (coinciding with the visit of Prime Minister Shastri to Moscow) will also undoubtedly increase not only the fear of China but further exacerbate the conflict between the CPI/R and the CPI/L and their front organizations, most of which are turning more and more towards the pro-Soviet CPI/R.

Of the many front organizations in India, the six most active in 1962-63 (as reported by USIA) are briefly described below, and in more detail in an unclassified attachment. Perhaps more than communist front organizations in other countries, the Indian are closely intermeshed, marked by dual leadership and simultaneous participation in several front groups as well as in the communist parties. Particularly recently, communist energies have been diverted and introverted by the left-right splits at home, as well as by outside threats to India. Always vocal, and certainly never to be underestimated, the front activities in India since 1962 appear to consist mostly of the "saved talking to the saved."

Peace and international friendship fronts, of which there are over 20 operating in India, were organized to discredit Western foreign policy and to advocate support by India of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. These fronts oppose Indian cooperation with the West and Indian support to the West in any way.

The largest peace front is the All India Peace Council - an affiliate of the World Peace Council - with approximately 5,000 active members and about 35,000 sympathizers. It has branches in all major cities in India and has been an effective channel for communist propaganda. However, particularly since the Chinese invasion of 1962, its influence has been declining, even though pro-Soviet elements are in firm control.

The Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity, the major Indian communist international peace and friendship front, has played an important role with the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization as the chief support of the Soviets against the Chinese. It cooperates with the All India Peace Council and appeals to the same groups, although it has never had the popularity of the All India Peace Council.

Most communist countries have a front organization within India ostensibly organized to improve their reputation and influence. The most prominent of this type is the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society which is considered the most active front organization in India. It has directly supported Soviet foreign policy and has also supported and fostered communism within India. It has sought, by low key propaganda, to establish the image of the Soviet Union as a peaceful and progressive nation.


The All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS), an affiliate of the World Federation of Trade Unions, is the largest labor front organization and one of the oldest fronts in India. It is not now very active; the left-right split in the communist movement (particularly concerning cooperation with the Congress Party) is mirrored in the AIKS, and the CPI/L is dominant. Because of lack of unity, factionalism even among the dominant left wing, and of the longstanding strength of the Congress Party in the countryside, the AIKS has been prevented from achieving major influence in rural India. However, its emphasis on building support among the peasants makes it potentially one of the most influential.

Much of the communist effective power for political agitation, sabotage and espionage has come from its urban labor front, the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), also a member of the WFTU. The AITUC cannot match in size the 1.5 million member Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), the labor body of the Congress Party. However, not being under any obligation to the ruling party as is INTUC, it has greater tactical freedom -- particularly in its ability to call strikes in vital industries. Less than one-half of Indian laborers belong to any union and the AITUC probably controls only a fifth of these. But those under its control are strategically placed and fairly well disciplined. Until 1964 when CPI factionalism became rampant, the AITUC was the most effective trade union federation. It has served as an important supporter of the Soviets' attempts to maintain their influence within Asian trade unions over and against the Chinese although it too is faced with a division of leadership between the CPI/R and CPI/L.

The All India Youth Federation, affiliate of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, appears to be fully controlled by the CPI/R, although some left elements have split off. It is one of the most active Indian fronts, and also active within the Soviet controlled mass youth organization, the WFDY. In many ways, however, the youth and student groups can hardly be called front organizations in the usual sense since their communist affiliation and dominance are well known and they openly operate as an official organ of the CPI.

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


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904.

WHITEWASHING THE KGB

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SITUATION: There has always been a respectable volume of fiction and other material published in the Soviet Union, glorifying the "Chekist" (the term for a secret policeman, derived from the name of the original Bolshevik secret police organization, the Cheka). Recently, however, the KGB, possibly with the collaboration of the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, seems to have launched a publicity campaign to "improve the image" of Soviet secret police and espionage organizations. This campaign appeared to start just prior to Khrushchev's fall, with the disclosure of a highly colored version of Richard Sorge's story ( [REDACTED] ), and by February 1965 it had reached such a pitch that Literaturnaya Rossiya, a literary weekly, published a cartoon showing a long line of writers eagerly waiting outside an editorial office, carrying manuscripts with such titles as "Operation Rose," "Operation X," and "Operation White Elephant."

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One explanation would be that, in view of revelations of Stalinist misdeeds in the last few years, not to mention the long-standing and well-founded public fear and hatred of the secret police, the high command of the KGB decided more effort was needed to make their organization popular; popularity would make it easier to get tips, recruit informants, and pressure suspects. There would also be political reasons for such a campaign. Publicity campaigns on behalf of government departments are familiar phenomena in many countries; even where the government is undemocratic, a department which is not popular or at least respected finds it harder to get money and a voice in major decisions. The 1953 denunciation and execution of Beria, the change of the Ministry of State Security to a Committee, and Khrushchev's anti-Stalin campaign were accompanied by personnel cuts, morale problems, and a loss of influence for the Chekists. None of the leaders intended to allow another Beria to arise. Now, however, when there is no single dictator, the secret police have a chance to try to "sell" their organization. Coming at this juncture, the KGB's campaign suggests both the achievement of a position of power, and also an effort to

expand that position by making the Chekists less vulnerable to criticism and attack within ruling circles. Furthermore, when men or organizations are powerful, they cannot hear their praises sung loudly enough.

There is plausible speculation (see attachments) that the KGB has been virtually uncontrolled for the last few years, and that just prior to Khrushchev's fall the KGB was actually sabotaging his foreign policy and undermining his position. The KGB's power position was indicated by an August 1964 article by Roger Hilsman showing that in the 1962 Cuban crisis, it was a KGB officer in Washington, and not Ambassador Dobrynin, who did the crucial negotiating with the Americans. (Hilsman in 1962 was chief of the Department of State's intelligence and research organization, and in a position to know.) The KGB apparently served Khrushchev faithfully in the Cuban affair. But signs soon appeared that suggested KGB sabotage of Khrushchev's diplomacy.

In October 1963, the KGB staged the arrest of an American professor and held him incommunicado for 16 days, at a time when a Soviet-American cultural exchange agreement was pending. In March 1964, British and American attaches were drugged in Odessa, as Western doctors proved by clinical evidence and laboratory tests. Six months later, British and American attaches were seized and searched in Khabarovsk, in violation of diplomatic immunity, by what Pravda called the "glorious Chekists."

The most striking evidence that the KGB is uncontrolled appeared in September 1964. A West German technician, Horst Schwirkmann, came to Moscow and cleared out many hidden KGB microphones in the West German Embassy; his work accomplished, he obtained the required Soviet Foreign Ministry permission for a tourist trip to visit a historic monastery building at Zagorsk, 70 km. from Moscow. While visiting the monastery (on 6 September) he suddenly felt his left pant leg become damp; it turned out that he had been attacked with mustard gas, a deadly gas used in World War I which burns the skin. Soviet Foreign Ministry officials held up Schwirkmann's evacuation to the West for two days, apparently because the KGB hoped to get him into a Soviet hospital where he could be interrogated (or "liquidated"?). Since this whole action was likely to upset arrangements for a Khrushchev trip to Bonn, one must conclude that Soviet Foreign Ministry officials are more influenced by the KGB than by considerations of foreign policy.

Khrushchev can hardly have favored the Zagorsk operation; probably he either knew nothing about it beforehand, or could not prevent it. His own overthrow five weeks later (15 October) can only have taken place with at least the acquiescence of the KGB, who at a minimum failed to inform him of what they knew was afoot. A. N. Shelepin and his protégé V. Ye. Semichastny, the past and present chiefs of the KGB, received prompt recognition after the coup. On 16 November, Shelepin became a full member of the CPSU Presidium and Semichastny became a full member of the CPSU Central Committee. Aside from Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Suslov, Shelepin is the only party Secretary who is also a member of the Presidium, and of

these four, Shelepin is the only man also to hold high state office, being a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Since Khrushchev's fall, Shelepin has been the most prominent of the younger leaders, carrying out an important mission to restore and further exploit relations with the United Arab Republic, and also making a special trip to Mongolia. (He was with Nasser when the Egyptian leader in a speech told the US to "drink up the sea," and shortly afterwards Nasser invited Ulbricht for a visit.) Khrushchev occasionally tried to reassure the Soviet public that party control would prevent a return to police terror; now, instead of such reassurances, we have the KGB propaganda campaign.

As part of the campaign, the popular magazine Ogonek is publishing a serial biography of Sorge, written by Sergei Golyakov and Vladimir Ponizovsky; perhaps the campaign's true sponsorship is shown by the fact that Golyakov and Ponizovsky describe Sorge as a member of a special branch of the NKVD (the KGB of the 1930's), rather than as an employee of the GRU, as was actually the case. Sorge the hard-drinking libertine is described as a dedicated man who performed a lofty duty. Several recent novels have used the theme that Stalin and his cohorts overlooked vital intelligence reports: The Last Two Weeks, by Alexandr Rosen (Zvezda, 1965, No. 1), June 1941, by Grigori Baklanov (Znamya, 1965, Nos. 1 & 2), Not Born as Soldiers, by K. Simonov (Znamya, 1965, Nos. 1 & 2), and I am Responsible for Everything, by Yuri German (Zvezda, 1964, No. 10). These describe devoted and courageous secret agents, whose warnings were ignored. Vadim Kozhevnikov, who has already contributed Stars on Earth about Soviet agents in Germany, will have another espionage story serialized this spring, The Shield and the Sword. Meanwhile, names of rehabilitated NKVD officers, purged by Stalin, frequently appear in the Soviet press [REDACTED], and articles have memorialized the contributions of the Chekists in rooting out Nazi spies during the war: on 3 and 2 April, both Izvestiya and Sovetskaya Belorussiya carried such an article by a Lt. Gen. Zheleznikov, who has signed a similar piece for Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) as "Former chief of the Administration for Counterintelligence and 'Smersh' on the Bryansk and Second Baltic Fronts." Pravda announced on 21 February that Col Lev Yefimovich Manevich had been posthumously made a Hero of Socialist Labor, and lauded his refusal, as the agent "Etienne," to give in under interrogation by the police of a reactionary government.

It is easier to imagine that a KGB man might be courageous than that he would be humane. Yet a recent serialized novel, The Fall of the Jesuit, by Ya. Golovanov (Komsomolskaya Pravda, 8-20 December 1964), tries to depict today's Chekists as cultured, intelligent, sympathetic and compassionate. They are soccer fans, discuss ballet, drink mineral water, and think fondly of their children. The story describes a ne'er-do-well with religious tendencies who serves the Germans, spends time in Paris brothels, returns to the Soviet Union, and finally tries in a clumsy way to sell information to an American spy. In one episode, the Chekists discuss, before making a house search, how they can do it without frightening the children in the house. And the author comments that when he was a child he was



always afraid to pass the NKVD headquarters, but now he realizes that there has been a transformation since the days when a police agent was judged by the number of persons he arrested; there has been an "irreversible" change in the psychology of the police.

Another story, Reverse Reading, adapted from a book by N. Tarianov and published in Leninskoye Znamya (24 November-2 December 1964), relates that besides uncovering traitors and outwitting foreign agents, the Chekists have to present Soviet courts with "irrefutable evidence of criminal activities"; while in England the illegal possession of "official secrets" is a crime in itself, the Soviet police must prove that the information was in fact security information and that "it was passed to a foreign power." According to these stories, the KGB gets permission from a Procurator (district attorney) before searching a home and before making an arrest. Sometimes, however, the true position of the KGB in Soviet society shows through: at the end of The Fall of the Jesuit, the villain is arrested by a KGB man who "tactfully" gets him out of a hospital ward by masquerading as a doctor, examining all the patients, and telling the culprit he will have to go to Moscow for treatment; it is hard to imagine a police official being allowed to do all this in a non-Communist hospital. The Jesuit story also reveals that the KGB's informants are omnipresent, and its files all-inclusive--they still include "confessions" made in 1941, when suspects were often tortured into making false accusations, and the KGB still considers these "confessions" valid.

The fact is, that while the KGB does not serve a Stalin any longer, there is still no effective protection against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. A paper from a Procurator means little if the Procurator himself is afraid of--or in league with--the police. If an American professor like F. C. Barghoorn can be framed and held incommunicado, what happens in the case of Soviet citizens, who have no Embassy to look out for their interests, no President Kennedy to intervene for their release? In the case of Schwirkmann, terrorism was apparently a principal aim; the KGB hoped to intimidate foreign embassies to keep them from trying to protect themselves against audio-surveillance. Soviet citizens have of course no protection from such surveillance--or intimidation.

In today's USSR, punishment is often carried out without reference to courts and state prisons: poets and writers (e.g., Mikhail Naritsa, Valeriy Tarsis, and Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin) are placed in mental hospitals, or are banished for a time to factories and construction sites (e.g., Andrei Voznesensky and Viktor Nekrasov). Rebellious youths are sent to the Virgin Lands or other labor colonies (see Mihajlo Mihajlov's first Delo article, in New Leader attached to [REDACTED] indeed Shelepin himself, as chief of the Komsomol, is said to have supervised the sending of hundreds of thousands of young people to the Virgin Lands in the middle-1950's, before he was officially connected with the KGB. With the approval of easily influenced local Soviets, the police may legally impose up to five years exile at forced labor for those they charge with "parasitism," without any recourse to the courts.


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In the courts themselves, defense attorneys are intimidated and guilt is presumed unless disproven. It is very easy for Soviet authorities, including police authorities, to convey dire threats of punishment to a people which still remembers the Stalin era. At the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, where he denounced Beria and Stalin, Shelepin also advocated calling the "anti-Party group to strictest account," said that the actions of "hooligans, thieves, loafers, bribe-takers and slanderers should be classed as grave crimes," and lashed out against certain "unstable elements" among the cultural intelligentsia, accusing them of "sabotage on the ideological front." Such statements, coming from a KGB chief, were ominous to Soviet ears.

Today, Shelepin has become more powerful than he was in 1961; if no longer the official head of the KGB, he is apparently still the supreme authority in police and intelligence matters. (For example, a Pravda item of 10 April 1965 stated that Shelepin had addressed a meeting of Party administrative specialists and Republic Ministers of the Defense of Public Order, held under Central Committee auspices; under Soviet conditions, this indicates that Shelepin is the CPSU Central Committee Secretary supervising the police organs.) His ruthlessness is shown by the fact that in 1959 he personally awarded the Order of the Red Banner to Bogdan N. Stashinsky, the assassin of Stefan Bandera, the Ukrainian exile leader.

Extracts from The Fall of the Jesuit are contained in an unclassified attachment to this guidance. An unclassified biography of Shelepin and reproductions of articles are also attached. See also Press Comment 5 May 1965, pp. 11-14.

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905.

THE PROSPECTS FOR AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAM

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SITUATION: There has been much speculation that if the war in Vietnam could only be brought to an end, Ho Chi Minh and his Communist Lao Dong Party would--given Ho's international background and the traditional Vietnamese fear and hatred of China--become an Asian Tito. Even should such a possibility deserve serious consideration in the total Vietnamese problem, a close and realistic examination of the evidence shows there is little reason to expect such a development.

In the first place, Tito's Yugoslavia was separated from the USSR by some 200 miles and a ring of newly absorbed satellites whose dependability in a crisis was at best untested. Vietnam has a common border with China. Yugoslavia had common land borders with anti-Communist states, which Vietnam does not have.

In the second place, and perhaps of greater importance, at the time of Tito's demands for a voice in the Communist camp (and subsequent expulsion) he was a vigorous man of 55 in firm control of his Party and its day-to-day operations. In contrast, Ho is 75 years old and his role in the Communist Lao Dong Party is at the present moment questionable. It is certain that he does not deal with day-to-day problems and some sources even say that he is being used to take advantage of his immense prestige as a veteran revolutionary in the world Communist movement.

Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party made their stand for independence and for the right to rule their own country. But ever since Vietnam has been divided, the stated objective of Ho and his Communist Lao Dong Party has been to take over South Vietnam. Nor are these expansionist objectives limited to South Vietnam. There are indications that Ho and the Lao Dong Party still have responsibility in the World Communist movement for all of the areas of the former French Indochina. If this is true it means that they will ultimately expect to extend their realm to include Cambodia and Laos as well as South Vietnam.

The Yugoslav Communist Party in 1948 was intensively loyal to Tito personally and to his programs. But there are factional rivalries at the highest levels of the North Vietnamese Communist Party. The extremist, pro-Peking faction is led by the Party First Secretary Le Duan and includes the following prominent members: Truong Chinh, former Party Secretary General; Le Duc Tho, chief of the Party Organization

Department; Nguyen Chi Thanh, former top political Commissar in the North Vietnamese Army; and Hoang Van Hoan, former ambassador to Peking. This extremist faction is rigidly doctrinaire and espouses the harsh lines of the Chinese Communists. The so-called pro-Soviet moderate element in the Lao Dong Party has long been led by Premier Pham Van Dong. His primary support comes from the hero of Dien Bien Phu, Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap, who is known to bear personal enmity toward both Truong Chinh and Nguyen Chi Thanh. State Construction Commissioner Le Thanh Nghi, North Vietnam's foremost industrial management and planning expert, is also a member of the "moderate" faction. The existence of such high level factions in the Party would make it impossible for Ho to eliminate foreign influence in Vietnamese affairs even if he had the desire to do so.

The existence of these factions guarantees Chicom domination of all parts of Vietnam that come under the control of Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party. If the Soviet-oriented "moderate" faction took over and tried to eliminate the pro-Peking extremist faction altogether, the extremist faction would, in the final analysis, establish their own government somewhere along the Chinese-Vietnamese border and immediately call on Chinese aid to thwart the plans of the "revisionist usurpers." The USSR could not possibly sustain its adherents in Vietnam, in the face of determined Chicom opposition, unless it resorted to the use of nuclear weapons against China itself. This is exceedingly unlikely.

If, on the other hand, the pro-Peking extremists come to fully dominate the North Vietnamese Party there is no doubt that they will look toward Peking, both as a developmental model and supplier of material aid. They will be as eager as Peking is to prove that all non-Communists (and even some of the Communists) are paper tigers who do not have the determination to oppose the will of China.

Thus, so long as the Sino-Soviet split continues and that split is reflected in the factions of the Communist Lao Dong Party, those portions of Vietnam ruled by the Communists will inevitably come under Chinese Communist domination. It is for this reason that Ho tried so hard to mediate the Sino-Soviet split and to avoid making a definite and final choice between China and the Soviet Union. He realizes that for him there is no choice; the act of choosing will make a Chinese province of however much of Vietnam he controls. To think that he can declare himself and his country free from the domination of Communist China is to ignore reality.

Other aspects of the Vietnamese question are important for the Free World to consider. In the arrangements that took place at the end of World War Two it was understood that all of Yugoslavia would come under the Communist zone of influence. The Free World had no commitment to the Yugoslav people to protect them from the ravages of a Communist takeover. Such is not the case in South Vietnam. The 15 million people there have rejected Communism as the form of government under which they wish to live, and have made a long and valiant struggle against a foreign inspired and

supported invasion; they deserve the protection of the Free World. In view of the manner in which the North Vietnamese Communists have treated their own people, it is not difficult to imagine the torture and terror they would inflict on those who have fought so long and so hard against them.

In 1948, there was good reason for the non-Communist world to risk more on the possibility that Tito might throw off the shackles of Stalinist domination. Until that time, the Marxists claimed that conflict between Communist states was impossible. They said that the competition of monopoly capitalist states for raw materials and markets was the cause of wars and that the same kind of national rivalries could not, by definition, take place between Communist states. The myth that the mere adoption of Communism would eliminate conflict forever made it attractive to naive, unthinking people. The thesis was an important aspect of the "science" of Marxism, of the legend that Communism was the means for achieving Utopia for mankind. Tito's rebellion caused that myth to collapse on the heads of Communists everywhere and the Sino-Soviet split some ten years later laid the ghost to rest forever. To exert any great effort on Ho's defection or to gamble away the freedom of Southeast Asia on it is clearly not worth the risk involved. Ho will find, as have all others who have shown the desire to lessen their absolute dependence on their Communist masters, that the Free World is more than willing to help them. But first they must show the desire.

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MOSCOW'S FOREIGN "AID"  
THE SOVIETS TAKE THEIR POUND OF FLESH

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The materialism of the Soviet leaders is not merely theoretical. In terms of worldly goods, they have shown themselves ready to take what they can get, no matter how damaging to unwary partners. Alone among the victors of World War II, the USSR seized and shipped out of the territory it occupied as much machinery and equipment as it could haul away. This took place not only in East Germany, but in all the areas through which Soviet armies passed. In the "ex-enemy" countries, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, reparations were demanded, \$300 million from Rumania and \$200 million from Hungary, while East German reparations deliveries came to \$4.3 billion before they were ended in 1953. It is estimated that East Germany had delivered \$15 billion worth of goods aside from reparations by 1957. After reparations were reduced, the Soviets continued to claim joint ownership of former German assets with Hungary and Rumania (thanks to German investments and seizures of property during the war, these assets comprised many key industries), and required Poland to deliver coal as "recompense" for a tiny share in East German deliveries. "German" property in Czechoslovakia was shipped to the USSR. In Manchuria too, which Soviet troops occupied at the end of World War II, the Soviets stripped the steel mills of machinery with a capacity to produce two million tons of steel. An American audit estimated that \$2 billion worth of equipment was taken from Manchuria by the Soviets.

Such policies could not be carried on indefinitely, as the Hungarian and Polish revolts of 1956 showed, and the satellites do not pay tribute any longer. But the Soviets continue to make a ruble whenever they can. In the construction of the large-diameter pipeline from the USSR to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany, a Soviet-sponsored project which will give Soviet oil a competitive advantage over Rumanian oil in the other satellites, the Czechs, Hungarians, and East Germans themselves pay the costs of construction. Austrian reparations deliveries to the USSR continued until 1963. Egyptian cotton has been resold by the Soviets in the



markets where the Egyptians themselves normally sell their cotton; Polish coal has been resold in East Germany; Ghanaian cocoa has been resold in Western Europe; Greek tobacco, cotton and other products have been resold in Western markets. Where barter arrangements have been concluded, the Soviets have later overpriced the goods they supplied hoping that the overcharge would not be noticed; in Afghanistan, where this was done, the prices were only brought into line after alert Afghan officials pointed out the discrepancy with Western prices. When the UAR protested in such a case, the Soviets coolly replied that the overcharge of 30 per cent was to compensate them for the fact that the Egyptians could not pay hard currency. Soviet trade officials insist that any trade disputes be settled by Soviet courts, which are hardly impartial. When the Soviets want to break a contract for political or other reasons, as when they canceled a contract to deliver \$20 million worth of oil to Israel, Soviet courts ensure that no damages fall on the USSR.


Soviet motives in their trade and aid program are mainly political, but the so-called "aid" is a sound commercial proposition as well. Although the term "aid" calls to mind grants or sales at minimum prices, such as US aid programs have often made, Soviet "aid" is really only trade on the barter principle, with an interest charge included. Aside from a few "loss leader" projects, like the Bhilai steel mill in India, the Soviet contribution in such arrangements consists of goods which are relatively redundant from the Kremlin's point of view (if not always from that of the Soviet consumer). This is particularly true of military equipment, which forms an increasingly large proportion of Soviet "aid." The sale of obsolete arms is almost pure profit, and sometimes even current models can be traded away without any hardship to the Soviet forces, thanks to the tremendous scale of Soviet arms production, in 1962 estimated to be 23 per cent greater than in 1955. (For a discussion of the Soviet political use of arms deliveries, see BPG #833, 12 October 1964, and attachments.)


Even with other Communist governments, the Soviets expect to make money on arms sales. The Chinese Communists have published their letter of 29 February 1964 to the CPSU Central Committee (Peking Review, 8 May 1964), charging that Soviet loans to China mainly served for the Chinese purchase of war materiel, used largely in the Korean War. On 20 April 1965, the Albanian newspaper Zeri I Popullit repeated the charge, comparing the Soviet leaders with the famous "merchant of death," Basil Zaharov. Both the Chinese and the Albanians point out that Soviet experts serve as a means of penetration and internal control in the countries to which they are sent. The Soviets, from the Chinese-Albanian standpoint, not only let others take the political risks and costs in bloodshed, they also make a financial profit and place their own agents in key positions. (See attachment for text of Chinese and Albanian statements.) The Chinese and Albanians are of course trying to make an anti-Soviet case, but their charges are quite credible. Moreover, the Soviets are now quite likely charging North Vietnam for any arms delivered to that country. Other governments, like Sukarno's and Nasser's, support "national liberation" and "anti-imperialist" struggles, and pay the Soviets for the wherewithal for conducting or aiding these campaigns, which assist the Soviets politically.


The Albanian article also charged that the Soviets provide obsolete weapons to North Vietnam. On April 29, President Jomo Kenyatta rejected an arms shipment at Mombasa, partly because the arms were obsolete and partly because he did not want to employ the 17-man team of Soviet "technicians" who had arrived in Nairobi a week earlier. Another aspect of Soviet profit-taking trade policies is their failure to provide costly service facilities or stocks of spare parts for their customers; their usual rule is to unload and let the customer worry about operation. Thus the UAR recently had to purchase \$125,000 worth of spare parts from General Motors for Soviet-built trucks, copies of old GM designs. (Spare parts are also a serious problem within the USSR itself.)


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Fact Sheet

~~Background Use Only~~

24 May 1965

Major Communist Front Organizations in India

Brief descriptions of selected front-organizations indicate the interplay of front group leadership, among CPI and other fronts. This pattern is typical of Indian front organizations, all dependent upon an elite few for direction and coordinated efforts:

All India Peace Council. Pro-Soviet elements are in firm control of the AIPC. This was symbolized by the November 1963 replacement of Pandit Sunderlal, a former president of the India-China Friendship Association, by the pro-Soviet Congress MP Diwan Chaman Lal as its chairman and dropping of CPI (left) leader A. K. Gopalan from the AIPC's Presidential Committee. Though Chitta Biswas replaced the CIP (right) Secretariat member Romesh Chandra as an AIPC joint secretary general at this time, the latter was simultaneously chosen to replace the late Saifuddin Kitchlew on the WPC's Presidential Committee. This is the WPC's highest organ, and it currently has both Sunderlal and Chaman Lal as members, too. Biswas previously served at the Vienna International Institute for Peace, the WPC's headquarters. The AIPC has thirty-two members on the WPC, within which it gives strong support to the Soviet cause.

In or prior to March 1960, Diwan Chaman Lal, not then prominent in the AIPC, organized the Indian Parliamentarians for Peace. Numerically speaking, this was primarily a Congress Party affair, and it contained about one-third of all the members of India's national Parliament (both houses). It continued to draw in a wider circle than just those formally affiliated with the AIPC even after Lal's rise to prominence in the latter organization. The Parliamentarians sponsored a "seminar" on international relations in December 1963 and got Nehru to inaugurate it. The main organizer and manipulator of this meeting was said to be the Communist Romesh Chandra. A much larger international "peace conference" was sponsored by the Parliamentarians in November 1964 on the theme of carrying forward the program of the late prime minister. Once again the prime minister (this time Lal Bahadur Shastri) was inveigled into addressing the meeting. V. K. Krishna Menon, though India's most famous leftist cabinet member prior to the Sino-Indian border war of late 1962 and not formerly associated with the peace movement, was a key showpiece at both meetings.

Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity. This organization has played an important role within AAPSO where it has been the chief support of the Soviets against the Chinese. Two significant changes in its personnel occurred in 1964 when Tara Chand\* replaced Rameshwari

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\* Tara Chand (Congress) was vice president of the India-China Friendship Association at the time of its November 1962 dissolution. Like Rameshwari Nehru, he is a WPC member.



Nehru as president and Chataur Narayan Malaviya replaced Muhammed Kallimullah as Indian representative on the Cairo AAPSO Secretariat. Though ostensibly a joint front of the Congress party and the CP India (right), the dominant personality in the organization appears to be Romesh Chandra, a Secretariat member of the latter party. Until November 1963 Chandra and C. N. Malaviya were pro-Soviet joint secretaries general of the All-India Peace Council.

All India Trade Union Congress. This organization, with a claimed strength over a million and a government-certified one of about half that amount, has been India's most effective trade union federation, at least until it became the scene of CPI factionalism in 1964. In that year the AITUC's "figurehead" president, S. S. Mirajkar, while still formally a member of the CPI (right), took the lead in accusing AITUC secretary general S. A. Dange of misappropriating AITUC funds and of having offered his services to the British in 1924; Mirajkar then proceeding officially to join the CPI (left). The No. 2 AITUC leader, Secretary K. G. Srivastava (Dange's 1962 deputy on the WFTU Executive Committee), has been notably pro-Chinese in the past. Meanwhile, the CPI (left) set up a committee in December 1964 under Politburo member P. Ramamurthi, a 1962 AITUC vice president, to take control of state trade union councils and individual affiliates from the CPI (right) leadership of S. A. Dange. This leftist challenge has been partially responsible for the AITUC's rightist leadership's engaging in the price-rise/food shortage demonstrations of 1963-64.

Dange is one of the WFTU's twelve vice presidents, and the AITUC maintains an official representative at Prague WFTU headquarters, one Mahendra Sen. Another Indian resident in Prague, Satish Chatterjee, served as secretary general of WFTU's Trade Union International of Transport, Port, and Fishery Workers. In October 1963 Dange and Srivastava (see above) attended the Moscow Congress of Soviet Trade Unions.

All Indian Kisan Sabha. This organization appears to be under the effective control of the CPI (left). Its president, the CPI (left) Politburo member A. K. Gopalan, appears to have used the organization's facilities (offices, communications channels, etc.) to set up a left-wing parallel to the right-wing-dominated CPI organization during 1962-64, prior to the official formation of a second CPI. Its secretary general, Jagit Singh Iyalpuri, another leader of the CPI (left), serves as a vice president of the Agricultural and Forestry Workers TUI. Its membership was estimated at a quarter of a million in August 1964.

All India Youth Federation. Though CPI (left) elements have split off to form separate units in Andhra and Kerala, the CPI (right) appears to be fully in control of the Federation's central organization. CPI (right) Central Executive Committee member P. K. Vasudevan Nair, MP, continues to serve as president; as of January 1963, he was also his party's youth and student responsible. CPI (right) National Council member Sharda (Sarada) Mitra not only continues to serve as AIYF secretary general, but he was made secretary of the Party Headquarters Branch

in New Delhi in late 1964. Govinda Pillai, an AIYF secretary, succeeded Vasudevan Nair as a WPDY vice president in 1962, and he represents India at the Budapest WPDY headquarters where he also serves as an editor of World Youth. Pillai attended the Moscow World Youth Forum of September 1964.

24 May 1965

Selected Indian Communist-Front Peace  
and International Friendship Associations:

1. All India Peace Council (affiliated to World Peace Council)
2. Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity (member of Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization)
3. Institute for Afro-Asian and World Affairs
4. Indian Writers Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity (member Afro-Asian Writers Bureau)
5. Indo-Soviet Cultural Society
6. Indo-Bulgarian Friendship Association
7. Indo-Cuban Friendship Association
8. Indo-Czechoslovakia Cultural Society
9. Indo-German Democratic Republic Friendship Society
10. Indo-Hungarian Cultural Society
11. Indo-Korean Friendship Association
12. India-Latin American Solidarity Committee
13. Indo-Mongolian Cultural Society
14. Indo-Moroccan Friendship Association
15. Indo-Polish Friendship and Cultural Society
16. Indo-Rumanian Friendship Association
17. Indo-Vietnam Cultural Society
18. Indian Association of Afro-Asian Youth
19. India Committee of Support of Continental Congress of Solidarity with Cuba
20. Indian-Cuban Society

Indian Communist-Front Labor,  
Agricultural and Professional Associations

1. All-India Kisan Sabha (affiliate of World Federation of Trade Unions)
2. All-India Trade Union Congress (affiliate of World Federation of Trade Unions)
3. All-India Consultative Conference of Young Writers
4. Indian Federation of Working Journalists (affiliate of International Organization of Journalists)
5. All-India Association of Democratic Lawyers (affiliate of International Association of Democratic Lawyers)
6. Association of Scientific Workers of India (affiliate of World Federation of Scientific Workers)

Indian Communist-Front Cultural,  
Women and Youth Associations

1. All-India Progressive Writers' Association
2. Indian People's Theatre Association
3. All-India Students' Federation (affiliate of International Union of Students)
4. All-India Youth Federation (affiliate of World Federation of Democratic Youth)
5. National Federation of Indian Women (affiliate of Women's International Democratic Federation)

LONDON OBSERVER  
22 November 1964

CPYRGHT



EDWARD CRANKSHAW

# Brezhnev & Kosygin begin to look shaky

THE features of the chief actors in the new power-struggle in the Kremlin are already beginning to emerge through the smokescreen laid down by Moscow after Mr Khrushchev's fall. As Messrs Podgorny and Shelest, the two Ukrainians, on the one hand, and Shelepin and Semichastny, the two political policemen, on the other, loom up through the mists the overlordship of Messrs Brezhnev and Kosygin begins to look very provisional indeed.

These two men are, in effect, being invited to preside over extensive party reforms, or shake-ups, the execution of which will be shared by Podgorny and Shelepin, each exploiting the situation to his own advantage.

A fortnight ago I suggested that Mr Semichastny, the egregious youth leader turned head of Political Police, must have played a critical part in neutralising his own master, Mr Khrushchev, before the comrades could sew him up. What was not clear at the time was whom Mr Semichastny was acting with and for.

His prime mover might have been Mr Podgorny, like Mr Khrushchev an ex-party boss of the Ukraine, who, surviving after the downfall of Khrushchev, with whom he had been very intimately associated, had evidently been playing for his own hand. Or it might have been Mr Shelepin, Mr Semichastny's predecessor both as head of the Komsomol and of the K.G.B. There was nothing to tell whether Semichastny was for or against his immediate senior. Now it is clear that he was for him.

## Elevated to Presidium

Shelepin has profited greatly from the other people. Already a member of the party secretariat, he has now been elevated to the Presidium. The only other men who belonged to both these august bodies are Brezhnev, Suslov and Podgorny. Since Brezhnev appears to lack the stuff of leadership, and since Suslov has always been a back-room figure, this means that Podgorny and Shelepin are now the two most powerful and challenging men in the Soviet Union.

Podgorny, at 61, is now in charge of the party cadres—i.e. the staffing of all party appointments—and has also undertaken the job of party reform: undoing certain of Khrushchev's arrangements aimed, amongst other things, at reducing the power of provincial party leaders. Podgorny is thus in a position to put his own men where he wants them.

But Shelepin, 46, tight-lipped, cold-eyed, all ambition, has the Political Police still in his pocket. Semichastny has been rewarded by promotion to the Central Committee. He is still master of the State and Party Control Committee, which exercises an inspectorate over all

party functionaries—the men in future appointed by Podgorny.

There are other interesting promotions; but the important thing is the immense concentration of power in the hands of both Podgorny and Shelepin. This in itself is sufficient to induce rivalry of the most cut-throat kind. It seems inevitable that the men who came together to get rid of Khrushchev will soon be turning on each other. Mr Brezhnev's role is evidently to hold the ring. It is the sort of employment that in the Soviet Union rarely lasts long.

For some time to come the sound and fury seem likely to be limited to the domestic front. In Soviet foreign policy there will be no sharp change just yet.

## China offensive

This applies to Moscow's China policy, too. After the very brief truce which followed the removal of Khrushchev, and which was highlighted by Chou En-lai's Moscow visit, China is once more resuming the offensive. Speaking through her obedient satellite, Albania, she has now formally declared that the new Soviet leadership has demonstrated its intention of continuing on Khrushchev's revisionist and anti-Leninist path.

This announcement should be taken together with Friday's lurid attack on Khrushchev in *Red Flag*, which pointedly rejects the Kremlin's official explanation of the reason for his fall. Earlier in the week the Chinese had issued another warning of the return to the *status quo ante*, with a short, sharp statement about Sinkiang.

It had already been suggested here that there was more to the Sinkiang quarrel than met the eye and that Mr Khrushchev, not contenting himself with stirring up trouble on the border, was planning a deeper operation aiming at raising a major rebellion which could lead to the virtual detachment of the province from China and at the same time wreck China's nuclear installations.

Although it is clear that the breach between Russia and China is not to be bridged, although Chou En-lai went home with nothing to show for his visit, there is evidently to be a certain attempt to paper over the cracks, at any rate as far as State relations are concerned. It is reliably reported that the Soviet Union is about to extend limited economic aid to China and that Mr Brezhnev has committed himself to visit Peking. At the same time the most incendiary operation of all, the conference of 26 parties scheduled for December, through which Mr Khrushchev was determined to force a formal split with China in the teeth of opposition from fraternal parties everywhere, has now been quietly dropped.

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LONDON OBSERVER  
29 November 1964

INSIDE RUSSIA

by our Diplomatic Staff

# How K was overthrown

ALEKSANDR SHELEPIN, one of the two newly appointed members of the Soviet Party Presidium, was the principal planner of Khrushchev's overthrow, closely aided by the State security (K.G.B.) chief Vladimir Semichastny. This is confirmed by information that has reached THE OBSERVER from reliable Soviet and Communist sources.

Shelepin's coup was originally planned for Khrushchev's return from Scandinavia in early July but had to be postponed because preparations were incomplete.

As for Khrushchev himself, he is now under house arrest in a block of V.I.P. flats in Moscow's Granovskiy street, a bare five minutes' walk from the Kremlin.

Shelepin, who is only 46, was already one of the most powerful men in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev even though he was not a member of the Presidium. As head of the party-State control commission he was the party's official watchdog over all aspects of the country's life. He rose to power first via the Soviet youth organisation and then the K.G.B., which he controlled from 1958-61 and began the purge of the secret policemen responsible for the Stalin terror.

As a result of Shelepin's and now Semichastny's work, the K.G.B. is believed today to be no longer the independent organ of terror of Stalin's day. It does, however, still have the functions of a secret police, charged with detecting any political threat to the regime.

Little is known about Shelepin as a man but largely because of his age he should prove less of an enigma to the West than men of Khrushchev's vintage, though not necessarily any more amenable.

The appointment of Mr. Brezhnev as party leader after Khrushchev's fall was made on the understanding that it be temporary. Although Brezhnev will now have a chance to prove himself, he is not considered to be the stuff of which leaders are made.

The biggest gap in the account

of Khrushchev's fall is the lack of any information about the role of Podgorny, the one-time Ukrainian party leader who now controls party administration and is the main rival to Shelepin.

Shelepin was greatly helped in finding support for his plan, the sources say, because of the way Khrushchev had handled a quarrel with another Soviet leader, Kozlov, in early 1963. Kozlov was generally regarded as the man most likely to succeed Khrushchev and in the winter of 1962-3, after the Cuban crisis, many observers believed that Kozlov was leading something of an attack on the Soviet leader.

According to the latest information differences of opinion culminated in a stand-up row in the Presidium between the two men. For the first time Kozlov raised openly the charges of one-man rule against Khrushchev, saying that he had ignored the principle of "collective leadership."

## Instances of discontent

He also attacked Khrushchev for the failure of his economic policies. Kozlov cited instances of active public discontent which he personally had had to cope with. He mentioned the troubles in Novocherkassk in South Russia, in the summer of 1962, when troops had to be called out to control people rioting over poor living standards, principally food shortages. He also mentioned the several dock strikes in Odessa.

Kozlov said that he for one did not want to take responsibility for such things and supposed that others too would be unwilling to take the blame for the mistakes of one man.

Khrushchev replied with a brutal verbal counter-attack and full use of his large battery of swear words, and managed to prevent the build-up of a movement in Kozlov's favour. The sources suggest that it was the strain of these events which

led to Kozlov's stroke in April, 1963 (he had already had probably two heart attacks). Shortly after this, Khrushchev's men, and notably his son-in-law Aleksei Adzhubei, dropped obvious hints that Kozlov would in no circumstances return to politics—though in theory he remained a member of the Presidium.

The incident provided Shelepin with powerful ammunition. If Khrushchev could get rid of Kozlov like this, what was to stop him removing any other of his colleagues who dared challenge him.

One can only guess how and when Shelepin set about winning over the other Soviet leaders. But the sources indicate that some of the key figures were susceptible to certain suggestions. The party leadership, even if only on a temporary basis, could be offered to Brezhnev, a man whom Khrushchev and others considered merely a political commissar skilled at carrying out orders.

Mr. Kosygin could be offered a free hand in his special field of light industry, where the country badly needed first-class ideas and administration. Into the bargain he would make an excellent prime minister. He has a reputation for personal modesty and an ascetic way of life which it was felt was true to the Leninist ideal of the good leader.

Mr. Suslov, the party theoretician, would appreciate that his job would be far easier without the erratic utterances of Mr. K. Some of the younger members of the Presidium, like Polyansky and Voronov, could be offered more freedom in their parts of the economy, notably agriculture.

Certain men were not brought into the plan, or only so late they could do nothing about it: one of these was Leonid Ilichev, the party secretary, whose job it had been to dress up Khrushchev's cultural policy in correct Marxist language.

Mr. Mikoyan, Khrushchev's Soviet leaders, was also told late about the plan: he was then offered a choice of going with the

CPYRGHT

majority or against it. He eluded the majority and it was his task to persuade Khrushchev to go to Sochi for his Black Sea holiday in October because the Soviet leader's absence from the capital at this time was a pre-requisite for the coup's success.

Thanks to the co-operation of Semichastny and the K.G.B., Shelepin was able to check that no one brought into the plan had second thoughts. The actual machinery of the coup also depended entirely on the full co-operation of the K.G.B., as already indicated in THE OBSERVER.

## Khrushchev's first indication

Khrushchev's first indication that something was up came when Brezhnev telephoned him from Moscow early on the morning of Tuesday, October 13. Brezhnev said that the Presidium would like Khrushchev to attend an important meeting in the capital as soon as possible. Khrushchev scolded Brezhnev for taking such an initiative, whereupon Brezhnev suggested that if Khrushchev would not come to Moscow, the Presidium would go to Sochi.

The Soviet leader then agreed, brought forward his meeting with the French Science Minister, Gaston Palewski, to 9.30 a.m. and then cut it short after half an hour. Khrushchev then drove to the neighbouring airport of Adler, where he found not his own plane, but one sent from Moscow, flown by a different crew. When

he arrived at Moscow's Vnukovo 2 airport he was met not by his usual Zil 111 car but by a different one, with a different driver and bodyguards. He was also met by Semichastny.

Any attempt by Khrushchev or his aides to rally last-minute support was rendered impossible by the simple device of changing all the numbers on the *vertushka* telephone system. The *vertushka* was originally the wind-up telephone in use after the Revolution and possessed only by the most important people. It is now used to describe the secret telephone links between top party and State officials, both at their work and homes.

Khrushchev was driven straight to the Kremlin, where the nine active Presidium members were waiting for him. The meeting was started at once by Suslov, who spoke from rough notes. The only documents he had with him were a *Pravda* from Stalin's day and another of the Khrushchev era. He used these to show that Khrushchev was now getting his name in the Press as much as Stalin ever did.

His attack stressed Khrushchev's personal behaviour and his mistakes in domestic policy before foreign affairs.

## Growing role of Adzhubei

The growing role of the extremely able Adzhubei was particularly bitterly attacked. The other leaders were already

suspicious of the way Adzhubei could sell Khrushchev his ideas, by-passing them. Their suspicions were strengthened by Adzhubei's occasional insolence towards them and the independent way he ran the paper *Izvestia*.

Khrushchev's reply to Suslov, punctuated by interventions of varying length by the other Presidium members, alternated between anger and comparative calm. He cursed his colleagues, then admitted making mistakes, and then denied it. The only moment of laughter came when he asked to stay on as Minister of Agriculture. Finally he said he would like to call the Central Committee.

This was the moment of triumph for the coup's organisers. Foreseeing this move by Khrushchev (he had beaten Molotov and Kaganovich in 1957 by calling up the Central Committee) they had already called to Moscow a carefully chosen quorum of the committee.

The chosen members were not let into the secret until their arrival in Moscow, perhaps two days before Khrushchev himself. Once they had been told why they had been called they were not allowed out of the Kremlin again.

His colleagues were therefore able to lead Khrushchev at once into a nearby room for the Central Committee meeting he had requested. Khrushchev left the Kremlin some time on the Wednesday morning for his house on the Lenin Hills overlooking Moscow. It was there that—faithful to the tradition of Russian political recantation—he wrote a letter to the Central Committee admitting his errors.

Aleksandr Nikolaevich SHELEPIN

~~Background Use Only~~  
December 1964

Chairman of the Committee for  
Party-State Control  
Secretary and Member of the  
Presidium, CPSU Central Committee  
Deputy Chairman of the Council of  
Ministers

A.N. Shelepin, one of the youngest of the top officials of the CPSU, is an outstanding example of the ambitious party official who makes a career out of his administrative and organizational talents. In mid-November 1964, he became a full member of the CPSU Presidium. His most important administrative post had been that of chief of the KGB (Committee for State Security) from 1958 to 1961; he was succeeded in this post by Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny, who appears to be his protege, and it is probable that Shelepin still has a role in making major decisions involving the KGB, the Soviet secret police organization.

Shelepin was born in 1918 at Voronezh, the son of a railwayman. From 1936 to 1939 he studied history at the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature; his later career suggests that he may have spent more time in Komsomol (Communist Youth) activities than on his studies. He served during the Russo-Finnish War in 1939-1940, and then (in 1940) got into full-time Komsomol work in Moscow as an instructor and later as head of the Agitprop Department of the Moscow City Komsomol. In 1943 he became Secretary for Cadres in the All-Union Komsomol and a member of the All-Union Committee for Physical Training and Sport, an organ of the government. Between 1947 and 1952 he was also Vice President of the International Union of Students (IUS), and he led the Soviet delegation to the World Festival of Youth and Students in Prague in 1947. From 1952 to 1958, he served as First Secretary or Chief of the All-Union Komsomol. In this capacity, he had over-all responsibility (in 1954-1957) for sending hundreds of thousands of Soviet youth to the Virgin Lands as "volunteers." During this period he was also Vice President of the Communist international youth front, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and he took part in youth festivals, meetings and congresses in various Bloc cities as well as in London and Helsinki.

In April 1958, at the age of 40, Shelepin put youth work behind him and served a short term as Chief of the Central Committee Party Organs Section. Then, in December of that year, he became Chairman of the KGB, replacing General I. A. Serov, who was transferred to the command of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. Shelepin was the first chief of the secret police not to have spent years in "conspiratorial work." It may be that he was intended to strengthen party control of the police, to improve the public image of the police, or to sweep out some of the bureaucratic cobwebs which had accumulated since the days of Felix Dzherzhinsky. While in this position, he personally conferred the Order of the Red Banner on Bogdan Stashinsky for Stashinsky's murder of Lev Rebet and Stefan Bandera.

In November 1961, Shelepin left the KGB, having become a member of the Central Committee Secretariat a month before. Then at the  
Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300030004-3

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Committee, with Shelepin as Chairman. The Committee's activities have not received much publicity, but the Committee is able to take disciplinary action or launch legal proceedings against persons who cause "damage to the cause of building Communism." This usually means corruption or negligence in party or state work, especially in the economy, but could mean any activity the party leaders consider undesirable. Stalin used his control of a predecessor organization, the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin), as one of his main instruments for gaining control of the party and state bureaucracy by weeding out potential opponents.

Only three men besides Shelepin are both members of the Secretariat and full members of the Presidium: Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Suslov. Further, of those who are both Secretaries and Presidium members, only Shelepin also holds high state office, being a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. With his background in the Control Committee and the KGB, Shelepin is evidently one of the most powerful men in the Kremlin.



~~Background Use Only~~

24 May 1965

THE FALL OF THE JESUIT

by Ya. Golovanov

(The events described in this story are true-to-life and documented. The "Jesuit" is not an imaginary figure, and even this autumn you could have encountered him on the streets of Moscow.

The leadership of State Security Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers has allowed our special correspondent to become familiar with all of the documents on the "Jesuit" case, and also to participate directly in the day-to-day work of the co-workers of the KGB Administration, throughout Moscow and Moskovskaya Oblast long before the criminal activity of the "Jesuit" was stopped, and then to attend the interrogations, and talk with witnesses and accused.

In the story we have changed merely certain names of its heroes -- true heroes and "heroes" in quotes. The time and locality of the events have been maintained.)

[Synopsis: Anatoliy Yakovlevich Prokhorov in 1940 was a weak schoolboy, teased by his classmates for his interest in religion. He becomes involved with an illegal "Society for Training Jesuit Clergy," which seeks to attract youth into the church, and other members of this organization give his name to the secret police. By the time his name is in the files, however, he is drafted into an artillery regiment, and he is taken prisoner by the Germans soon after their attack in June 1941. He escapes and becomes a novice in the church in German-occupied Vil'no, then gives information to the German SD, serves in a labor battalion, and comes to Paris to spy on the White Russians for the Germans. After Liberation, he falls into the Paris underworld and after a year in prison, decides to request repatriation under the false name of Anatoliy Yakovlevich Yershov. After his return to the USSR, he is soon arrested, confesses, and is sent to the labor camp at Pechora in February 1947. Released in the amnesty of 1956, he goes to Moscow.

In 1964, the secret police observe that one "Nikolay" is in contact with an American, Howard Sclaton, and discover that "Nikolay" is Prokhorov. Searching Sclaton's room at the Hotel Ukraina, KGB investigator Aleksandr Roshchin finds that on the block calendar, the sheet for 21 December has been torn out, and the sheet for 22 December shows a faint impression].

The results of the analysis were ready by evening. The sheet of 20 December was blank. On the sheet of 22 December, there was the scarcely noticeable impression: "281618 L. D".

"The number is a 6-digit one, that is for sure," said the Captain, in whose laboratory experts were working. "Evidently they were written

(Cont.)

by a Japanese Flowmaster -- a felt pencil with India ink. The impression was broad but very weak.

Thus, 6 digits. Perhaps this was a Moscow telephone number? But L. D. -- were they initials? Two hours were required in order to establish that at the telephone number B8-16-18 there was no one with the initials L.D. The telephone with this number was the apartment of Aleksandr Il'ich Krasovskiy, a doctor of physical-mathematical sciences, who had lived here for many years with his wife Valentina Andryevna, mother-in-law Antonina Dmitriyevna Vereshchagina and their son Vladimir, a student.

Studying the Krasovskiy family did not give Roshchin even the slightest basis to suspect these people of any improper acts or intentions. A good warm Soviet family, but why would Sclaton have their telephone number? Roshchin decided to visit the Krasovskiys, to have a talk with them, and to try to find even the slightest shadow of a story which could explain everything.

The three of them talked together: Roshchin, Aleksandr Il'ich and Valentina Andreyevna. Roshchin said straight off: "your telephone number was discovered in the possession of a foreigner who is of interest to our organs of state security. Can't you help us to find out why this telephone number would be in his possession? He got it very recently, in the second half of December."

"I can't understand it," said Aleksandr Il'ich, shrugging his shoulders. "I know many foreign scientists, but don't remember giving them my home telephone. I make so secret of it, but I didn't have any need to do so... I don't have any close friends among foreigners... Actually, I don't know how to help you..."

"Do you recall any foreigners phoning you recently?" asked Roshchin.

"I remember very well that no one called."

"Perhaps someone other than the members of your family uses the phone?"

"No, no one does."

"What about people who visit you frequently?"

"We have many friends and acquaintances," said Aleksandr Il'ich spreading his hands, "but as far as I remember they all have their own phones..."

"Well there is Lyuba...", said Valentina Andryevna.

"What about Aunt Lyuba?" Aleksandr Il'ich said to his wife.

"Aunt Lyuba is the sister of my mother, and her last name is Shabolina," explained Valentina Andryevna to Roshchin. She frequently comes over to drink tea with mother, and they chat... You know, old people have their own affairs... Aunt Lyuba lives with Valeriy her son and they don't have a telephone, and recently she warned my mother that she would be phoned, and asked her not to forget that they were to leave the telephone number..."

"And how old is Lyubov'... What is her patronymic?" asked Roshchin.

"Lyubov' Dmitriyevna. She is 63. She is somewhat younger than mother..."

"Yes..." said Roshchin with a smile. "Valentina Andryevna, I have a request to make of you. As soon as your aunt is telephoned and gives the telephone number, please tell me. We want to find out this telephone number before Lyubov Dmitriyevna does. All right?"

"Yes, yes, of course," nodded Valentina Andryevna.

"Of course, if we must... We understand..." responded Aleksandr Il'ich.

Roshchin left the Krasovskiys on foot. He wanted to stroll and think a bit. He needed a glass of water. A 63 year old woman, Lyubov' Dmitriyevna, L. D. Shabolina, was a foreign agent? Nonsense! What did he know about her? She had lived all of her life in Moscow, she had never worked, and 3 years ago had buried her husband. She lived with her son an engineer. Imagine what a joke it will make when the fellows find out that I have solved the mysterious initials L. D. Nonsense, absolute nonsense. It means either that I must find another person with the initials L. D., or ... Lyubov' is the "cover up" and someone is using her as the "front." The apartment of the Krasovskiys was very suitable for this. The old people are there drinking tea. This was very plausible. Then the phone. One old lady is given a telephone number, and she relays it. To whom? Should I go to Lyubov' Dmitriyevna and have a talk with her? That is dangerous. The person whose will she is following blindly may be near by. That could spoil everything.

[Synopsis: The KGB soon discovers that Prokhorov has been corresponding with one Bocharov in Riga, an orthodox priest, and one Kuznetsov in Orsk, an old friend from the camp at Pechora; also, Prokhorov is receiving mail at various addresses.

Looking back, the author ponders why Prokhorov should have become a traitor to the Soviet Union, and recalls that after his release in 1956, Prokhorov had shown cynicism about the sputniks, the dam at Bratsk, and the Virgin Lands.]

There is a word -- ideals. Sometimes we use it without thinking, and then this word dims. The problem is not in misuse, but in its very essence. What are ideals? These ultimately, I think are your counting

of right and wrong, justice and deceit, your evaluation to everything that your people and you yourself are doing. Communist ideals are our measuring stick by which we can check the world... I am always thinking about Prokhorov... What about his ideals? Perhaps, he was convinced that the world of capitalism was freer and happier? Certainly there are a number of people convinced of this. No, I do not think so. This conviction could not be found either in his statements or in his letters. He was not interested in economic indices, and he never looked at statistical manuals.

It would seem that a person who is alien to our ideology should be excited, for example, by the industry of the US which is ahead of us for many of its indices. But he was excited by the poetry of the cafe and romantic "free love." I had lived in Paris for a short period of time but I know nevertheless that the owners of the cafe work hard 18 hours a day, and that in this beautiful city there is a gigantic underground industry of prostitution, an industry, with its own chiefs and bosses, borders and laws, supply and demand, and with terrible filth and cynicism. How could he not see this during the years he lived in Paris?

If in our nation he could have consumed continuously without giving anything in return, he would have chosen Soviet power. But since it is impossible to live in this manner here, he could not stand Soviet power.

[Synopsis: Expelled from the church because he had syphilis, Prokhorov had gone to work in a bookstore, and dreamed of earning large amounts of currency and escaping to the West. In June 1963 he persuades a tourist from France to mail a letter for him in Paris, addressed to a war-time White Russian acquaintance, Prince Nikolay Boryatinsky, who is now teaching at the Navy College in Washington; a second letter is taken out by a Soviet geologist teaching a course at Cambridge University. Then Prokhorov makes the acquaintance of the son of the Krasovskys' Aunt Lyuba, Valeriy Shabolin, who works in a sensitive defense center. While Shabolin is in a drunken stupor, Prokhorov copies secret information from a notebook he finds in Shabolin's jacket. Shabolin is furious when he discovers this treachery, but is afraid to go to the KGB. Prokhorov first tries to peddle the information to an American journalist, who is too clever and cautious to accept written material. He next offers the material to Sclaton, whom he meets at an American cultural exhibition; Sclaton likewise refuses to take anything, but tells Prokhorov to give him a telephone number; this is the number which Roshchin found at the Hotel Ukraina. Thinking over the case--and at this point not knowing exactly what Prokhorov is trying to communicate--the police consider having a false "foreigner" use the number to contact Prokhorov.]

"What do you propose?" asked the general.

"Petr Mikhaylovich," Roshchin said quietly but convincingly, "we must find out what the intentions of Prokhorov are, and why does he need this contact..."

"How?" asked the general quickly. Roshchin understood: everything that they had said had been clear to the general from the very first words of the report and all of this time he was thinking: how? Kuprin moved his chair forward and the main conversation began.

"What if we would phone Krasovski and give Lyubov' Dmitriyevna a telephone number for a contact, huh?" Kuprin had saved this variation until the meeting with the general. "Prokhorov will bite and make contact. One of our men will be the 'foreigner.' And then we will see how Prokhorov behaves. We have one thing to check: whether we should tell the Krasovskiys about this call..."

The general thought for a second:

"This is not quite so, Boris Markovich. We have no reason not to trust the Krasovskiys. We have asked for their assistance, and why shouldn't we trust them? We cannot work without trust..." Once again he was quiet. "And in the second place -- Prokhorov knows that the call will be from Sclaton. This would tip him off. And we must find out what he is thinking of. We must know. And we must do this so as to exclude any pressure whatsoever upon Prokhorov, upon his will and psyche. If he is intending to communicate something to transmit something, we on our side must show not only that we are not interested in this, but on the contrary, we want to do everything to support his attempt. Absolute free will -- only in this case will we obtain reliable information... Your idea about the 'foreigner,' the general turned to Kuprin, "is also dubious. This is the extreme case. But I will allow that under the given circumstances such a solution is possible. Just a minute." The general pressed a button. The person on duty appeared silently at the door.

"Please ask Aleksandr Nikolayevich to come in," said the general.

Aleksandr Nikolayevich Vorontsov having heard the request of the general to be concerned with Prokhorov as an old police agent understood that the work was delicate and difficult.

"Well, my friends," he said turning to Kuprin, Kozin and Roshchin, "lets see what we can think up. Come around and see me and we'll have a talk..."

[Synopsis: The KGB, instead of telephoning, sends a letter to Prokhorov, supposedly from a "Catherine Gateway," saying she has something for him. As "Gateway," a KGB agent meets Prokhorov, tells him that she intended her letter for another Prokhorov, but in the process confirms that he is desperately interested in selling information to foreigners. This means that he is a spy. Then Mme. Krasovskaya, the scientist's wife, informs the KGB that someone has called their number and left another number for Aunt Lyuba. Within 20 minutes, Roshchin has found out that this is the telephone number of the hotel room of a Signor Mario Gozzi, supposedly on an Inturist tour from Milan. Meanwhile, Aunt Lyuba gives the number to Prokhorov, who trustfully goes to meet Gozzi; Prokhorov and Gozzi arrange that Prokhorov will leave his material in a railroad station locker and telephone the locker number to Gozzi's hotel room. Prokhorov goes to the airport and sees Gozzi board a non-stop plane for Paris. Actually, unbeknownst to Prokhorov, the KGB has simply had the tourist from Milan shifted to another room and has substituted a KGB agent for him; it is this fictitious Gozzi who meets Prokhorov, arranges to pick up his material, and boards the plane--"Gozzi" gets off the plane when it stops for "technical reasons" at Riga. The author attends a KGB viewing of a film of Prokhorov placing his material in the locker, and jokes with the KGB officers.]

"How the devil did you take that?" I whispered in Roshchin's ear.

"Just like Yrusevskiy films at the Moscow Film Studio," whispered Aleksandr Petrovich back.

"No, no joking. Where did you hide the camera?" I said without stopping.

"If you have to be at the station, how do you think it would be best to hide a camera: in a stack of hay or in a tree stump?" asked Roshchin not without some sarcasm.

"In a suitcase. Or somehow in a basket," I thought.

"Smart fellow," whispered Roshchin laughing, "a fine mind..."

I understand that all of this dialogue sounds like a typical conversation between Sherlock Holmes and Doctor Watson (incidentally, I could never understand why such an incisive person like Sherlock Holmes would choose as a friend such a dunce as Watson).

And Prokhorov was now next to locker 242 on the screen. A small boy with unmasked curiosity approached and was watching Anatoliy Yakovlevich set the figures on the lock: 2122.

"One of your men?" I whispered to Roshchin. I wanted to get back to the hay stack and stump.

"One of ours. Major Pronin made up as an 'October' member.\* And write it that way. So that everything is like a fast-moving detective novel..."

Prokhorov opened the locker. And once again he looked about. One could see that everything bothered him -- from the onlooking boy, to the sweeper cleaning the floor and the passengers on the bench. People were strange for him.

But people did not pay any attention to him. They were idling, reading, talking and eating. Prokhorov put the letter in the hiding place. But this time it was not in candy, but in a volume of "Eugene Onegin."

Later, when I held this volume in my hands, I suddenly felt hate for this person as never before. Let alone his contemporaries, he betrayed his ancestors, and besmirched Pushkin.

[Synopsis: Prokhorov is called up for army retraining at Yaroslavl, and this interruption gives the KGB a chance to question his contacts. Bocharov in Riga makes no attempt at concealment.]

He told everything in detail: when the interrogator requested him, he nodded politely, willingly, attempting in every way to show his readiness to be absolutely frank. And in fact he had nothing to hide as he could not keep anything secret from the police as they had already discovered everything. He only had to substantiate this. And he did...

Several days later we were in Orsk.

"Kuznetsov is a tougher nut to crack," said Roshchin. "He should have letters from Prokhorov, and these letters are extremely incriminating. Therefore the prosecutor has given us permission to search the apartment of Kuznetsov. This is little enough."

There were three of us in the hotel room: Roshchin, the prosecutor Mikhail Sergeyevich Nakhimov and myself. We were eating sausage with bread and drinking tea.

"Here is the problem," continued Roshchin, "Kuznetsov has a daughter, a little girl in the second grade. How can we search the place when she is there?" he turned to Nakhimov. "She would certainly remember this. It is a joke, her father being searched! This would be a scar for all of her life..."

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\*[Organization for children aged 6 to 9.]

They were quiet.

"Misha, do you have any children?" asked Roshchin.

"Yes I do..."

"I have two. I also have a daughter... She is entering the institute. I don't know if she will make it... My wife and I have been bothered..."

"And mine is still wetting the cradle," smiled Nakhimov.

"That is nonsense... If mine wet the bed, there would be no nonsense..."

Once again they were quiet...

"Misha," once again Roshchin asked, "what can we do with the little girl? We have to think of something..."

"We could ask the wife of Kuznetsov to take her somewhere for a little," Nakhimov left the sausage. "Perhaps to her grandmother's... For several hours..."

I do not like "shining" heroes. I do not want to idealize these persons. But I did hear this conversation myself. It did exist! Honestly, two officers of State Security on the eve of a difficult and complex interrogation and search were talking about this girl.

I remember as a school child I use to walk along Dzerzhinskiy Square, pass the grey granite large building, and I was always frightened when looking at the barrier which surrounded it, with the sentries with frozen faces, and their bayonets. They were protecting the security of my nation and why then this great timidity and this desire to speak more quietly and to go unnoticed? And here I was at this house. In three months of working with the secret police, I had understood a great deal. They had spoken long and frankly about the past and the present of our organs, about the break with the past, outmoded conceptions and methods, and about restoring the true police work norms put down by Dzerzhinskiy.

And the problem was not to merely renew the cadres of secret police, and to attract new, young people, educated in school, higher institutions, by the Komsomol, by the party and by all of our life; people for whom the 22nd Party Congress has become the highest expression of our thoughts, and an expression of the deeply personal and of one who has lived through a great deal. It was not a matter of merely changing the personnel. There was a change in the psychology of people which was very complicated and refined, not always painless, but always irreversible.



One of the leaders of our state security organs told me: "There was a time when we felt that the more persons a police agent arrested, the better he was working... And now each arrest forces us to think-- have I looked everything over, have I stopped on time, and escaped from the harmful influence..." But to say this, and to have this not in words but in deeds, requires a great faith and the courage of the communists, and a profound recognition of the necessity of an all-purifying psychological change.

Kuznetsov denied everything; he didn't know anything, hadn't heard about anything.

"I was in the camps," he said, "I don't want to go back... Yes, I am afraid, very much afraid... I know you..."

Nakhimov had to do virtually the impossible, to convince a mature, difficult and embittered person, to break the old and well established principle that he was confronted with an enemy.

"Why do you speak about the camp?" said Nakhimov. "It is not a question of the camp or of your fear. We are speaking about life, understand this. You have your home, your favorite work, a wife and daughter. Why do you feel that we want to put you behind bars? Who or why does anyone want this? Why should we, all of us, our people wish to multiply the number of enemies? Think about this. Understand our interest. If you are an honest man and a patriot, these interests cannot help but be yours..."

Three hours of a difficult and complex conversation. Three hours and the years of a shadowy life ran together. Kuznetsov fell silent. I saw his eyes and I saw how the wolfish persecution of his glance was replaced by kind human thoughtfulness.

"All right," he said rapidly. "All right. I will trust you. For the first time I will trust you. I know that I am a fool, but I will trust you. Give me some paper, and I will write everything myself."

There is the slang word "to be broken," that is to confess. But Kuznetsov was not "broken." He was not pinned to the wall with facts and evidence, he was not shown documents which showed his link with Prokhorov. This was not so. We merely spoke with him. His confession was not a forced capitulation, as he understood that he could not live any more like he had...

The search began at 2 o'clock in the afternoon when his daughter was on her way to school. Incidentally, we found a letter from Prokhorov in the belongings of his daughter, a doll with flaxen hair, her favorite because it could close her eyes...

[Synopsis: Shabolin is interrogated, and is beside himself with fear. He reveals that Prokhorov has hidden more secret material at the home of Sof'ya Alekseyevna Tolchinskaya, a good-hearted old woman who is an old friend of Prokhorov's.]

After talking with Sof'ya Alekseyevna at the investigators, we went to her apartment. We had to find the last hiding place of the spy.

"I will tell everything! I will spill the whole thing: Yes, he used to come to see me, he ate, drank and played the guitar... I have nothing to hide, I have done nothing bad," Sof'ya Alekseyevna was unduly excited. Her face became red, and she looked at the investigator, at me, at two neighbors in the apartment who had been invited to the search as witnesses, and she sought our sympathy.

"Relax, Sof'ya Alekseyevna," said Roshchin softly, seating the old woman in a chair, "we know that you have done nothing bad. But Anatoliy Yakovlevich was at your place, according to our information, and could have kept certain very interesting pieces of paper in your room.

"Yes! there are!," Sof'ya Alekseyevna once again jumped up, "there are! Here is a folder with his music..."

But there was only music in the folder. Romances. "You will soon come in your officer's overcoat," I read and smiled in spite of myself: in fact, they would soon come for him in an officers overcoat...

But only music and nothing more.

"Well," said Roshchin to Tolchinskaya, looking through the folder, "you must excuse us, but we must search."

"Please!" responded Sof'ya Alekseyevna readily. "If you want I will help you."

"Thank you," smiled Roshchin, "we can do it ourselves..."

In the infinite variety of human dwellings, one can clearly note a category of rooms which is strewn and hung with absolutely unnecessary things. This was exactly the category of rooms to which the room of Sof'ya Alekseyevna belonged. Here to find several sheets of paper was truly a Herculean task.

Roshchin leafed through all books, stacks of old yellowed newspapers and pencils. Everything. Roschin shook a briefcase, turned it over and shook it again. Dust. Crumbs. He ran his hand inside and felt a slit in the lining. Pressing his hand in further he pulled out a small packet. Several sheets of paper with fine writing on them were on the table.

"Here it is. And this is no musical dictionary," smiled Roshchin to Sof'ya Alekseyevna. He extended the papers to the witnesses.

"And all of the numbers!" said one of the women in terror. She held the paper in the tips of her fingers as if it was a leaf of a poisonous plant.

The search continued.

"Today 'Spartak' doesn't seem to be playing," said Vorontsov, "and therefore I hope Boris Markovich will not be watching the clock, and we can have a talk without hurrying. It is time to sum up..."

"'Spartak' is playing, but in Tbilisi," returned Kuprin, "and this circumstance will play a fatal role for Anatoliy Yakovlevich."

"I feel that we should talk not so much about Prokhorov," said Vorontsov, "as about Kuznetsov, Inozemtsev [a thick-headed friend of Prokhorov's] and Shabolin. As long as they are involved with Prokhorov, they will fall. Perhaps not fall but slide."

"Where is there farther to slide?" returned Kuprin. "A man has worked at a defense enterprise and it is bad enough that he has violated the elementary regulations of handling secret documents, but has consciously turned them over to the enemy. Shabolin could not help but know that Prokhorov wanted to sell the information received from him! No matter what you say, I will never believe this!"

"And nevertheless," began Vorontsov, without hurrying, "and nevertheless, what sort of person is Shabolin? A fellow 26 years old. Raised without a father. For a boy this is very important, a father... He finished Soviet school and a Soviet institution of higher learning. How could he be an enemy? Kuznetsov also, evidently, did a lot of thinking in the camp. At present he is working... He has a wife and daughter... You say 'I will never believe it.' These merely are emotions. The problem is not one of intuition. We must look into the soul of the man, and see just how sick it is, this soul, and whether or not it can be cured. So let us not hurry with our conclusions, there will be an investigation and we will gain a complete picture of everything that happened. Let us determine precisely the measure of their involvement in this case. And then let the law decide to what degree shall Shabolin, Inozemtsev and Kuznetsov are guilty. It would be no problem to slap them down... It would be more difficult to keep them up."

"Correct," agreed Kozin, "I don't think that they are lost to us..."

"Remember," continued Vorontsov, "there have been a good number of cases when persons at first glance were lost and then were literally re-born. They were caught, talked to, they went to work, they got advice from the family, from friends, from the Komsomol, from the party cells,

and the person changed. Not immediately, initially with caution, but they matured and understood that they were being helped and would not be thrown into prison..."

[Synopsis: At Yaroslavl, Prokhorov claims he is ill and requests a medical examination. The KGB has obtained a warrant for Prokhorov's arrest, and three officers and the author drive to Yaroslavl to pick Prokhorov up.]

We arrived at Yaroslavl' near evening. At the oblast administration of the KGB, we were joined by two investigators. We discussed the plan of arrest. Prokhorov was in a hospital ward with other patients. To arrest him there was rather bad -- we would begin with chatter: he would tell us where he was hurting, and he would demand that he be sent to Moscow to specialist professors. It was decided that Kuprin would enter the ward as a physician and tell Prokhorov that he was to be sent to Moscow, and could make sure that Prokhorov did not leave anything in the night table -- it was very possible that he might keep certain records on himself at all times, not trusting any hiding place.

Kuprin played the role of a physician like a professional actor. He did not go up to Prokhorov directly, he chatted with the patients, he felt the stomach of one, inspected the tongue of another, said something in Latin, and made notes in his pad.

"Prokhorov? so, so..." he stopped in front of a thin man with high cheek-bones. He had black hair combed back. He had penetrating eyes. He was completely quiet. "You will go to Moscow, Prokhorov. Your service is finished. We have taken a routine analysis, routine," said Kuprin, "you must be cured..."

In fifteen minutes Prokhorov, hiding with difficulty his joy that his deceit had succeeded so brilliantly, was already coming down the stairs with a suitcase in his hand.

"Anatoliy Yakovlevich," Kuprin touched him on the sleeve. "Follow me for a minute, please." Kuprin opened the door of the duty office. Prokhorov went in. He looked at the blue edging on the shoulder straps of the major-investigator.

"Are you Prokhorov, Anatoliy Yakovlevich?" asked the major.

"Yes, what is the matter?"

"Your documents please."

Prokhorov showed his passport.

"Prokhorov, Anatoliy Yakovlevich, born 1922," the major read out loud. "That's it," he said to Roshchin.

Roshchin looked at Prokhorov. He had been thinking about this man for a year night and day. For a year he had talked with him, argued, changed his mind, studied, hoped and was deceived in his hopes, studied his psychology, thought his thoughts and finally declared war on him. This invisible duel had gone on for a year. Now he saw him for the first time.

"According to a warrant from the deputy of the chief military prosecutor, you are arrested and accused under article 64 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR," said the major.

"What? What did you say?" asked Prokhorov amazed. "What was the article?"

"Treason to the motherland," said the major showing him the decree: "read it and sign."

His face was completely quiet, and only his hands betrayed him. The sheet of paper shook slightly like a man reading in the car of a moving train.

"There has been a misunderstanding," said Prokhorov dryly, "there has been some mistake..."

"We will see," said Roshchin quietly standing behind him.

Prokhorov turned around.

...It was completely dark. Prokhorov was sitting in the car between Roshchin and myself. He was quiet and looked ahead, beyond the grey road, beyond the headlights into the night.

In the aims of conspiracy, the workers in counter-intelligence had given Prokhorov the alias "Jesuit." This pseudonym was born by accident, but it seemed to me amazingly accurate. During the night of 2 October 1964, the "Jesuit" ceased to be. And there appeared in his place Anatoliy Prokhorov who was under investigation.

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24 May 1965

Soviet "Aid"

"In recent years the leaders of the CPSU have habitually played the benefactor and frequently boasted of their 'disinterested assistance.' When commemorating the 14th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February this year, Pravda, Izvestia and other Soviet propaganda media again beat the drum to the same tune. We have not yet made a systematic reply in the press, but we must point out that, so far from being gratis, Soviet aid to China was rendered mainly in the form of trade and that it was certainly not a one-way affair. China has paid and is paying the Soviet Union in goods, gold or convertible foreign exchange for all Soviet-supplied complete sets of equipment and other goods, including those made available on credit plus interest. It is necessary to add that the prices of many of the goods we imported from the Soviet Union were much higher than those on the world market....

"As for the Soviet loans to China, it must be pointed out that China used them mostly for the purchase of war materiel from the Soviet Union, the greater part of which was used up in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea. In the war against U.S. aggression the Korean people carried by far the heaviest burden and sustained by far the greatest losses. The Chinese people, too, made great sacrifices and incurred vast military expenses. The Chinese Communist Party has always considered that this was the Chinese people's bounden internationalist duty and that it is nothing to boast of. For many years we have been paying the principal and interest on these Soviet loans, which account for a considerable part of our yearly exports to the Soviet Union. Thus even the war materiel supplied to China in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea has not been given gratis....

"Your action [the withdrawal of Soviet experts from China] fully demonstrates that you violate the principle of mutual assistance between socialist countries and use the sending of experts as an instrument for exerting political pressure on fraternal countries, butting into their internal affairs and impeding and sabotaging their socialist construction."

(Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of February 29, 1964, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Peking Review, 8 May 1964.

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"Do you know, Soviet comrades, that the traitor Nikita Khrushchev and his fellows have compelled the Chinese comrades to pay for the armaments provided generously by the great Stalin for the Korean fight? Your treacherous leadership is but an arms merchant, just as that notorious adventurer, Zakharov. How can one trust these unscrupulous and dishonest men? And now what does your treacherous leadership do in the Vietnam war?

It blames China and alleges slanderously that she does not permit the sending of old armaments which it has earmarked for Vietnam. In point of fact these obsolete arms are insignificant and miserable....

"The Khrushchev revisionists are openly playing a dangerous game at the expense of the Vietnamese people, socialism and peace. The diabolical aim of the Soviet renegades is to get the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into their net by undertaking an operation to allegedly send arms and volunteers to that country. This 'operation' is presently being carried out through the hot war started by the Americans.

"This action by the Soviet revisionists, allegedly against U.S. imperialism and providing 'aid' to the DRV, is accompanied by U.S. bombings, which will only stop in the culmination of the Soviet operation -- that is, when so-called Soviet 'volunteers,' as alleged experts, rocket technicians, and so forth, have occupied key places in Vietnam."

(Editorial: "The Treacherous Group of Soviet Revisionists are Supporting the U.S. Imperialists in their Aggression against Vietnam," Zeri-i-Popullit (Tirana), 20 April 1965.)